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The purpose of this thesis is to explain the mortgage market’s behavior 
from 2001 through the first quarter of 2007 by discussing the economic incentives 
key market participants faced. By exploring incentives faced by key participants, 
a multifaceted yet logical explanation for the aggressive economic expansion and 
contraction appears. Throughout this paper I argue that the simultaneous acting 
upon of such incentives was fundamental to the market behavior and that the 
actions of each participant are, for the most part, understandable given the 
incentives that each faced. The paper will describe the monetary and cultural 
incentives underlying this behavior and show how they pertain to the 
macroeconomic context of the time and to the mortgage crisis. While the 
incentives discussed in this paper do not comprise an exhaustive list, they 
sufficiently cover the most vital influences. Most importantly, this thesis does not 
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The purpose of this thesis is to explain the mortgage market’s behavior 
from 2001 through the first quarter of 2007 by discussing the economic incentives 
key market participants faced. By exploring incentives faced by key participants, 
a multifaceted yet logical explanation for the aggressive economic expansion and 
contraction appears. Throughout this paper I argue that the simultaneous acting 
upon of such incentives was fundamental to the market behavior and that the 
actions of each participant are, for the most part, understandable given the 
incentives that each faced. The paper will describe the monetary and cultural 
incentives underlying this behavior and show how they pertain to the 
macroeconomic context of the time and to the mortgage crisis. While the 
incentives discussed in this paper do not comprise an exhaustive list, they 
sufficiently cover the most vital influences. Most importantly, this thesis does not 
attempt to find one factor to be more important than another.  
The paper is divided into two parts. Part One discusses the homebuyers, 
first explaining the expansionary period through an examination of structural 
incentives such as low interest rates and access to credit, and then analyzing 
personal incentives such as property ownership being central to the American 
1 
 2 
dream, herd mentality, speculation, and how individuals utilize the option theory 
of mortgages. Part One then examines the collapse of the mortgage system by 
highlighting why defaults occurred due to structural reasons forcing a homeowner 
into default, as well as personal motivations that impacted a homeowner’s 
propensity to default.  
Part Two examines the financial system. The structural changes that 
allowed for a booming mortgage market, such as low interest rates and financial 
innovation, are introduced and the many benefits to this new era of finance are 
highlighted. A significant portion of Part Two focuses on how and why lending 
standards diminished, while also emphasizing the increasingly unstable position 
the mortgage market was in prior to the crash. 
In conclusion, I posit that the aggregate action of all involved parties, 
responding logically to incentives, allowed the mortgage market to enjoy an 





PART ONE: THE HOMEBUYERS 
Homebuyers tend to be minimally discussed in economic literature as a 
fundamental cause for the expansion and contraction in the 2001-2007 mortgage 
market. Part One explores the integral role of these participants and posits that the 
aggregate action of individual homebuyers, motivated by systemic and personal 
incentives1, were a primary cause of the market behavior. The systemic and 
personal incentives faced by homebuyers are in line with one another and also 
consistent with incentives faced by financial participants in the mortgage market 
discussed in part two of this thesis.  
Chapter One provides an overview of the growing housing market. 
Chapters Two and Three present the systemic2 and personal3 motivations to 
purchase property respectively. Chapter Four provides an overview of the 
mortgage market crash. Chapters Five and Six present two frameworks that 
influence the propensity of borrowers to default utilizing Minsky’s financial 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper I will refer to two categories of incentives: systemic and 
personal. Systemic incentives are macroeconomic in nature; decided by the system which 
in turn influences individuals. Personal incentives are microeconomic influences; decided 
on an individual basis. 
2 Access to credit and affordability 
3 Culture, wealth building, and investment 
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instability hypothesis and the option theory of mortgages to discuss voluntary and 




CHAPTER ONE: A BOOMING MARKET  
Chapter One provides an overview of the expansionary period of the 
housing market with an emphasis on the homebuyer. The chapter begins by 
explaining that homeownership rates increased in 1995, before the conventional 
“mortgage bubble period,” due to increased income from the dot-com bubble, and 
then turns to a discussion of the post dot-com expansionary period of the housing 
bubble (2001-2007). 4  The rapid escalation in house prices and corresponding 
inflation of home valuation throughout 2007 is highlighted and will prove an 
integral part of the motivations for both expansion and contraction in the 
mortgage market.  
INCREASED HOMEOWNERSHIP: 
The mortgage boom is frequently discussed as a bubble that emerged in 
the wake of the dot-com crash (2001), however, it is important to realize that the 
housing market began to accelerate during the mid-1990s along with the dot-com 
                                                 
4 Throughout this paper references will be made to three specific periods: dot-com era 
(1995-2001), expansionary period (2001-Q12007), contraction (2007 and beyond). 
 6 
bubble. Homeownership rates show a sharp increase in 1995 and continue to rise 
dramatically through 20055 (See Figure 1: Homeownership Rates (1985-2007)6.  
Figure 1: Homeownership Rates (1985-2007) 
 
Growth in homeownership during the dot-com era (1995-2001) is partially 
attributed to an increase in net-worth during and due to the dot-com bubble.7  
Increased wealth from stock market gains from 1995 through 2000 enabled 
individuals to buy property, building the housing market alongside the stock 
market bubble. Real wage growth also contributed, experiencing a 12.4 percent 
cumulative growth during the late 1990s8 (see Figure 2: Real Median Household 
Income9).  
                                                 
5 While homeownership rates peaked in 2005, Q1 2007 is typically recognized as the 
peak of the housing bubble when housing prices and mortgage originations peaked and 
defaults/foreclosures began to accelerate. 
6 Data from U.S. Census Bureau 
7 Baker, 2008 
8 Rios-Avila and Hotchkiss, 2014 







































































































Figure 2: Real Median Household Income 
 
It would seem that the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2001 and 
subsequent income stagnation would have also quelled the American housing 
growth that inflated from 1995-200110, as it did in Germany and Japan11. Instead, 
the US housing market continued to accelerate despite a decline in real income 
because borrowing rates accelerated, fueled by new and innovative home loan 
structures. As household income experienced a slight decrease in the first half of 
the 2000’s, borrowing replaced growing incomes to continue the surge in 
homeownership rates. The borrowing-fueled expansionary period (2001-Q1 
2007), frequently referred to as the mortgage bubble, will be the primary focus 
throughout this paper.  
INFLATING HOUSING PRICES: 
Before digging into the core of this thesis, exploring incentives, it is 
important to document the dramatic rise in home prices during the expansionary 
period. Prior to 1995, real house prices had been essentially unchanged for 100 
                                                 
10 Rosner, 2001 




































































































Real Median Household Income
 8 
years (after controlling for inflation and differences in house size and quality) but 
then experienced a significant explosion during the dot-com era and expansionary 
period (See: Figure 3: Historical Housing Prices12). 
Figure 3: Historical Housing Prices 
 
In 1997, the average purchasing price of a home was only 2 percent more 
than the average in 1897; by 2002, house prices had risen nearly 30 percent more 
than the rate of inflation.13 Housing prices continued to surge until 2006, when the 
market began to abate. At its peak, the average price for a house was nearly twice 
the long-term average (1890-1997).14  
In contrast, while property values nearly doubled, rental prices during the 
same period increased only modestly, by 10 to 17 percent in real terms, and were 
already trailing off by 2002.15 This lopsided skew of home versus rental prices 
                                                 
12 Shiller, 2015 
13 Baker, 2002 
14 Beachy, 2012 
15 Baker, 2008, found that rents increased by 10 percent in real terms while Mayer and 



















































































































begins to hint that home values may have become over-inflated. It is evident, at 
least in hindsight, that during the expansionary period, a bubble was forming in 
the housing market and the explosion was founded on something other than the 
fundamentals of the housing market –such as population and income growth 
relative to the availability of existing housing, or in the intrinsic value of property 
ownership (low interest rates, and other factors that make real estate more 
attractive than bonds and stocks). If fundamentals were driving up the inflation in 
home prices, the price-to-income ratio and the price-to-rent ratio would remain 
stable. During the post dot-com expansionary era both ratios increased. 
While it could be argued that the access to credit that allowed heightened 
demand had changed the fundamental factors, because this proved to be an 
unsustainable debt market I conclude that the fundamentals were unchanged. 
Instead, the market moved away from the fundamental value of homes to a market 
focused viewpoint. The move to a market centric focus directly impacts the 
incentives to the homebuyer (and financial system).  
The increase in price-to-income indicates that borrowing decisions from 
homebuyers (and financing from lenders) are part of the cause for heightened 
demand in the housing market. The price-to-rent ratio is an indication that the 
influences were pushing market values above the intrinsic value of homes, 
providing stronger incentives for homebuyers to buy property rather than rent a 
                                                 
between 10 and 17 percent relative to what it would be if the mortgage market was 
normally functioning. Shefrin and Statman, 2011, Found the cost of owning houses 
relative to renting increased dramatically from 2003 to 2006, suggesting the existence of 
a bubble, where home prices greatly exceeded their intrinsic values. 
 10 






CHAPTER TWO: SYSTEMIC REASONS TO BUY 
This chapter addresses the systemic incentives to purchase property due to 
affordability remaining stable through innovative products and access to credit. 
STABLE AFFORDABILITY: 
Heightened demand for housing caused a natural market response, 
increased property values. Exploding housing prices and stagnant income should 
have provided a natural barrier for many potential buyers entering the market. 
Rising prices and stagnant income should, theoretically, make housing less 
affordable, cooling off the expansionary trend. However, affordability remained 
stable.  
The Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Composite Affordability 
Index shows that housing actually became more affordable during the boom. This 
index comes from the Department of Housing and Urban Development and 
measures the ratio of median family income to the income necessary to qualify for 
a mortgage to purchase a median priced house at prevailing interest rates. (See 
Figure 4: HUD Composite Affordability Index (1970-2007)16). 
                                                 
16 Data from U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Composite 
Affordability Index 
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Figure 4: HUD Composite Affordability Index (1970-2007) 
 
Many Americans continued purchasing property at escalating prices 
despite stagnant (or slightly decreasing) income because the appeared 
affordability17 remained stable due to access to credit markets and innovative 
mortgage products that made housing (seem) more affordable at the time. The 
appeared affordability of borrowing and access to credit provided systemic 
incentives to homeowners.18 
ACCESS AND NON-STANDARD MORTGAGES: 
Housing is one of the largest expenses for a consumer, taking a significant 
proportion of income or net wealth. Typically, this purchase will need to be 
financed. Access to credit markets is therefore a prerequisite to buying property. 
                                                 
17 The use of the term “appeared affordability, as opposed to “affordability” is significant 
because many financing arrangements appeared affordable but in reality were not more 
affordable during the course of the loan.  
18 An in-depth explanation for how and why the financial markets granted access and 
were able to maintain affordability during this period will be discussed in Part Two. The 
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Many factors can change the supply of loanable money and willingness of 
financial institutions to lend. During the boom, financial markets had ample 
liquidity and an appetite for residential lending.19 Access to credit allowed for 
heavy borrowing while innovative financial products encouraged it. 
Residential investments are easily advanced or postponed until adverse 
conditions in credit markets dissipate, thus appeared affordability has a significant 
impact on housing investment. Investment in housing will be relatively more 
affordable when interest rates are low or other financial innovations reduce up-
front and/or short-term costs associated with borrowing. Many Americans took 
full advantage of the favorable conditions from 2001 through 2006 through a 
number of innovative mortgage products that were available to borrowers, making 
affordability, and the systemic incentive to borrow, even greater. 
Prior to the mid-1990s, standard mortgages were the vast majority of 
originations.20 Conventional mortgage products come in 10, 15, or 30-year terms 
with a fixed interest rate and typically require a minimum 20 percent down 
payment. During the expansionary period interest rates on standard mortgages 
dropped to extraordinarily low levels.21 Elasticity in standard interest rates played 
                                                 
19 The importance here is that access was widespread, not why banks granted access; the 
latter will be discussed in Part Two. 
20 Baker, 2008 
21 See Part Two, Chapter Seven 
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a role in the recent United States housing boom.22 While standard interest rates 
were low, non-standard products reduced both interest rates and down payments.  
One new product, the adjustable rate mortgage (ARM), was particularly 
popular due to its unusually low interest rate. ARM loans have a low initial rate 
for two years and then a floating interest rate for the remainder of the loan. The 
initial rate23 is typically below the fixed-market rate. Rates on ARM loans 
decreased substantially despite the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage remaining stable. 
Initial rates on ARM loans were so low that they were likely a negative interest 
rate when accounting for inflation during the same period.24 The initial low rate is 
attractive to borrowers and provides a strong systemic incentive to advance a 
housing purchase to take advantage of market conditions. ARM loans are 
particularly useful for a homeowner planning on owning property short term or 
expecting to refinance soon, as ARM loans allow you to avoid paying an extra 
premium for a fixed-rate loan. ARM loans grew to 35 percent of originations 
during the expansionary period.25  
 Interest rates impact the affordability over the life of a loan, however, the 
upfront cost of borrowing due to a down payment is another consideration on the 
affordability of borrowing. The requirement that homebuyers make significant 
                                                 
22 Mayer and Hubbard, 2008 
23 Frequently referred to as a “teaser rate” 
24 Zywicki and Okloski, 2009 
25 Baker, 2008 
 15 
down payments was eliminated in the 1990’s26 and banks began to offer financing 
with down payments lower than 20 percent. During the expansionary period, 
some borrowers were even able to finance property with no down payment. The 
use of low/no down payment products became prevalent during the dot-com era 
and continued through the expansionary period. Prior to the 1990’s only 7 percent 
of mortgages had a down payment lower than 10 percent; by 2000, 50 percent of 
mortgages had down payments below 10 percent and 5 percent of mortgages had 
no (or an effective negative) down payment.27 By reducing the upfront financial 
burden a significant barrier to purchase property is removed, enabling more 
Americans to afford (at least initially) property.  
 Another loan structure that must be introduced was a negatively 
amortizing loan. Negative amortization loans allow the borrower to make 
payments that are below the interest rate on the loan. While this reduces the cost 
of servicing the loan, the loan will become larger overtime since the borrower is 
not covering the interest rate expense. 
REFINANCING:  
Borrowers were also allowed, even encouraged, to refinance their homes. 
Refinancing is a process in which a homeowner takes on a new loan and prepays 
the original loan on the property. Refinancing was widely used during the dot-
com era and expansionary period.  
                                                 
26 Rosner, 2001 
27 US Census Bureau, 1999 
 16 
A borrower struggling to meet their contracted payments might refinance 
in an attempt to stay current on the loan. In this case the borrower will have to 
give up more equity from their house to refinance. If real estate prices decline the 
ability to tap into the home for additional equity will be substantially reduced. 
During the expansionary period “strong house price growth increased the amount 
of equity in homes and enabled borrowers to refinance their mortgages despite 
being behind on the monthly payments.”28 
 Borrowers also refinance when credit with more favorable terms is 
accessible, or property values have risen and they wish to utilize a portion of the 
new equity.29 A refinancer might seek to take advantage of low interest rates and 
increase their wealth position by reallocating ‘trapped’ equity into a more diverse 
asset portfolio.30 
Other refinancers are motivated by the ability to smooth consumption 
during negative income or expenditure shocks.31 These borrowers are likely to 
extract or cash-out equity from the home and use that cash to fund consumer 
expenditures. Consumers who are motivated to refinance for consumption 
smoothing purposes have little to no liquid assets and typically use 60 percent of 
the equity extracted for consumption purposes.32  
                                                 
28 Schloemer, et al., 2006 
29 Discussed further in Chapter Five 
30 Rosner, 2001 
31 Rosner, 2001 
32 Rosner, 2001 
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HOME EQUITY LOAN:  
While many individuals borrowed as a means of financing new property, 
some borrowed, backed by already owned (or currently financed) property, as a 
means of increasing consumption. This type of loan, called a home equity line of 
credit, was legalized after pressure from banks beginning in the late 1970’s.33 In 
the early 1980’s, many tax deductions were eliminated but deductions on home 
equity credit were still allowed.34 Borrowing on equity from a home became more 
attractive than drawing on other lines of credit. The home equity loan market 
became more active throughout the mortgage boom with $237b in loans 
outstanding in 1995 and $445b by 2001 and over $1t by Q3:2006.35 
Most bankers believed that homeowners would not "pledge the house to 
buy a blouse.”36 Yet, many homeowners defied this prediction, proceeding to use 
home equity loans to buy blouses, cars, vacations, and more. There is broad 
agreement in economic literature that supports the notion of consumption 
supported by housing wealth.37 Home equity credit allowed homeowners to “live 
beyond their income” by taking the equity out of their homes and consuming 
today.38 Homeowners will increase consumption if the value of their property 
                                                 
33 Shefrin and Statman, 2011 
34 Shefrin and Statman, 2011 
35 Greenspan and Kennedy, 2007 
36 Story, 2008 
37 Greenspan and Kennedy, 2007 and Baker 2002 
38 Stiglitz, 2010  
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increases. In the rising home price environment during the expansionary period 
the availability of home equity beyond the initial purchase value of a house 
provided a strong incentive to undertake home-equity fueled consumption.  
Homeowners also frequently use home-equity to bridge financing for 
personal consumption expenditures39; which has been particularly popular post 
dot-com crash as consumers attempt to maintain the lifestyle that the dot-com 
economic environment had allowed.40 Borrowers who suffer negative income 
shocks or other adverse life events have been found to extract equity and obtain 
larger subsequent mortgages.41 The lending industry has encouraged middle and 
low-income families to conclude that “borrowing against their homes is a sensible 
way to plug holes in household budgets.”42  
While some criticize homeowners for treating homes like ATM 
machines,43 others have heralded the growth in lending to riskier borrowers as a 
positive break-through in extending credit.”44 The availability of home-equity 
credit served to entice homeowners to take on larger debt burdens backed by 
property, effectively raising the loan to value ratio on the property. 
                                                 
39 Greenspan and Kennedy, 2007 
40 Rosner, 2001 
41 Gerardi, Shapiro and Willen, 2008 
42 Schloemer, Li, Ernst, and Keest, 2006 
43 Shefrin and Statman, 2011 and Stiglitz, 2010 
44 Schloemer, Li, Ernst, and Keest, 2006 
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Changes in access, real and perceived affordability, and other reasons to 
leverage debt backed by property provided a strong systemic incentive for 
homebuyers and homeowners to increase their debt burdens. The desire for these 
participants to leverage debt will be seen to be in-line with those who provide the 
financing. The leveraging of debt directly impacted the expansion (and laid the 





CHAPTER THREE: PERSONAL MOTIVATIONS TO BUY 
In conjunction with the systemic influences there are a number of personal 
incentives that contributed to the heightened demand for property ownership. The 
American culture of homeownership was a strong influence in the propensity for 
individuals to become homeowners. Homeownership is also seen as a way to 
build wealth and an investment strategy. Herd mentality, which led to euphoric 
markets aggravated perceptions regarding property ownership.  
AMERICAN DREAM: 
To own, rather than rent, property is a value deeply rooted in American 
history and the American dream. In early America, property ownership was even 
a prerequisite to voting rights.45 The American culture of property ownership is 
deeply connected to individual liberties that embody our national identity. 
Homeownership is more than a utilitarian consideration and represents freedom 
while renting is associated with oppression by a landlord.46  
                                                 
45 (Lewis, 1970) 
46 (Shiller, Economic View: Mom, Apple Pie and Mortgages, 2010) 
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Aspirations beyond utilitarian consideration47 propelled many into houses 
they could not afford by evoking emotions and cognitive errors, blinding 
homeowners to the financial risk they might undertake in the process.48 Shefrin 
and Statman (2011) propose that “we are seduced by the expressive and emotional 
benefits of beautiful dream houses. We take pride in home ownership and feel 
powerful, knowing that no landlord can kick us out.”49 Even in the wake of the 
mortgage crash, a 2011 poll by New York Times/CBS News revealed that nine 
out of 10 Americans agree property ownership is central to a sense of wellbeing 
and the American dream.50 With the dot-com recession and stagnant incomes, 
borrowing to purchase property provided Americans access to the American 
dream as well as an ability to feel they were wealthier than they in fact were. This 
personal incentive to have these intangible benefits from property ownership is 
also significantly impacted by systemic influences that encourage the ideology 
around the non-utilitarian benefits to owning a home. 
Government has encouraged homeownership as a value in the American 
dream through decades of government policies such as the establishment of 
agencies specifically designed to increase access to credit for purchasing homes51 
                                                 
47 Utilitarian considerations fulfill our need for shelter but can also be extended to 
financial decisions regarding storing or building wealth. 
48 (Shefrin and Statman 2011) 
49 Shefrin and Statman, 2011 
50 Stretifeld, 2011 
51 Examples are the Rural Housing Service, the Federal Housing Administration, and the 
Federal Home Loan Banks 
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as well as through tax benefits,52,53 From the onset of the housing boom there was 
a rejuvenated push from the American government aimed to convince more 
Americans to own their own homes.54 A political discourse targeted at restoring 
the American dream through homeownership began with the Clinton 
administration during the dot-com era.55 In 1994 President Clinton declared: 
I think we all agree that more Americans should own their own 
homes, for reasons that are economic and tangible and reasons that 
are emotional and intangible but go to the heart of what it means to 
harbor, to nourish, to expand the American dream.56  
 
Executives at lending institutions echoed the political rhetoric. In 2003 
Angelo Mozilo, CEO of Countrywide Financial, stated that “expanding the 
American dream of homeownership must continue to be our mission, not solely 
for the purpose of benefitting corporate America, but more importantly, to make 
our country a better place.”57  
The goal of “reaching all-time high national homeownership levels by the 
end of the century” was targeted through making homeownership more 
affordable. Expanding creative financing, simplifying the home buying process, 
                                                 
52 Deductions for mortgage interest and real estate taxes, as well as a sizable exclusion on 
capital gains from home sales 
53 Doms and Motika, 2006 
54 Shefrin and Statman, 2011 
55 Rosner, 2001 
56 Clinton, 1994 
57 Morgenson and Rosner, 2011. At the time, Countrywide Financial was the largest 
mortgage lender in the US. In 2008 Countrywide would come close to collapse and 
experience an orchestrated buyout by Bank of America. 
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reducing transaction costs, changing conventional methods of design and building 
less expensive houses, among other means are found in an unprecedented 
partnership between regulators and regulated institutions.58 In response to the 
sponsorship of a relaxation of standards, Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan used the term “democratization of credit.” 59 The change in lending 
standards, discussed in Chapter Two and further in Part Two enabled borrowers 
with less-than-perfect credit to access home loans they would have been denied in 
the past. For many this brought access to capital to communities that had 
previously been underserved.60 
The increase in the American homeownership rate was partially driven by 
an increased propensity to be homeowners between 1995-2004.61 The desire to 
own property is a personal value based on American culture, however, it is not a 
universal desire. Only 34.6 percent of Swiss families owned their homes in 2000, 
whereas 66.2 percent of American families owned homes that year.62 The 
American dream provides a non-financial motivation to purchase property and 
frequently encourages property ownership beyond what is financially prudent.  
The non-utilitarian draw to property ownership is the base for one 
personal incentive to purchase property and when coupled with systemic 
                                                 
58 US Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1995 
59 Schloemer, et al., 2006 
60 Schloemer, et al., 2006 
61 Doms and Motika, 2006 
62 Shiller, 2010 
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incentives through political changes that allowed many Americans access to credit 
markets for the first time, through relaxing standards which increased access and 
affordability, was a powerful force in the market.  
BUILDING WEALTH: 
 Individuals are also personally motivated to buy property for personal 
financial reasons.63 Most households hold no, or low, corporate equity,64 therefore 
property is a primary way for individuals to build and store wealth. Building 
equity also been referred to as a forced savings plan because homeowners 
theoretically pay back a mortgage and accumulate home equity, building their net 
worth due to the lack of liquidity that equity in a home provides.65  Many 
households view the value of their homes as an important source of wealth for the 
future66 The effect of growing home equity, for some, has adverse effects. Several 
studies have shown that when home values climb owners feel less need to save for 
the future. 67 Other homebuyers bought multiple homes as a fixed-income 
investment strategy. Some even bought property on a speculative basis68, 
                                                 
63 This is also partially a reason why the government pushes for homeownership due to its 
“forced savings plan” effect.  
64 Tracy, Schneider, and Chan, 1999 
65 Rosner, 2001. Although home equity became more liquid through home equity loan 
and the requirement that potential homebuyers have equity to put into a home diminished. 
66 Case, Shiller, and Quigley, 2001 and Dynan, K. and D. Maki, 2001 and Maki, D. and 
M. Palumbo 
67 Baker, 2002  
68 Mayer and Hubbard, 2008 
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expecting to cash in quickly on rising home values69 with a buy and flip strategy. 
The personal incentive to buy property because of the desire for storing or 
building wealth was significantly impacted by euphoric expectations of home 
values and herd mentality.  
EUPHORIC MARKETS AND HERD MENTALITY:70 
 In the early 2000s demand for housing caused prices to increase, price 
increases in turn caused speculation on future increases in prices which caused 
prices to rise further –a self-fulfilling prophecy. Many buyers over-extrapolated 
and assumed that housing prices would continue rising indefinitely.71 This belief-
based theory of overvaluation72 is frequently motivated by Kahneman and 
Tversky’s (1974) representativeness heuristic73 where “people expect even small 
samples of data to reflect the properties of the parent population. As a result, they 
draw overly strong inferences from these small samples, and this can lead to over-
extrapolation.”74 During the expansionary period homebuyers believed current 
conditions would continue to exist.  
                                                 
69 Baker, 2002. Families are buying homes in large part as an investment rather than 
primarily as a place to live 
70 Title stems from Minsky’s use of the term “euphoric economy” found in Stabilizing an 
Unstable Economy 
71 Barberis, 2011 and Beachy, 2012 
72 Can also be seen in Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994 andBarberis, Shleifer, and 
Vishny, 1998, and Greenwood and Hanson, 2010 
73 Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 
74 Barberis, 2011. A model of bubble formation rooted in this heuristic can be found in 
Barberis and Shleifer, “Style Investing”, 2003 
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 Over-extrapolation of home prices could be a primary driver of the 
increase in speculative buying where buyers purchased homes expecting the value 
to increase. Speculative buyers could be making decision based on an investment 
strategy or to get a larger house consistent with American dream mentality. Some 
buyers took on large debt burdens expecting increasing values to help pay off 
loans while others bought multiple properties intending to sell when the value had 
increased.  
Herd mentality, the tendency of humans to base their decisions on those 
taken by the majority, may explain the over-extrapolation of home values during 
the bubble. During the expansionary period, “herd” members were buying homes 
at increasing rates, influencing their peers’ decisions to do the same.  
Herd mentality, like the representativeness heuristic, is a typical 
feature of human cognition. Since investors are human (not 
isolated, rational, and omniscient price calculators), such 
behavioral tendencies likely helped inflate the self-fulfilling 
housing bubble.75  
 
Herd mentality reinforced the over-extrapolation of prices and served to 
encourage speculative purchasers and those that took on homes they could not 
afford. 
Minsky supports the pro cyclical nature of the cycle, saying that people 
are momentum investors –consistent with over-extrapolation and herd mentality 
theories. In an explanation of Minsky’s work, McCulley (2009) stated: 
Human beings are not wired to buy low and sell high; rather, they 
are wired to buy that which is going up in price. This seems to 
make no sense, particularly when there is a known limit to size and 
                                                 
75 Beachy, 2012 
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affordability constraints – why would rational people buy a house 
for a higher price than other folks in the same financial 
circumstances could afford to pay? But we are not talking about 
rationality here, but human nature.76 
 
 This explains the rationality behind the rise in home prices because homebuyers 
followed the market price of property rather than the value if home prices had 
relied on fundamentals. Because homebuyers were not driven to find the intrinsic 
value of a home, but to base their decisions based off what other homebuyers are 
doing, the market value was driven up. Minsky’s insights are evident in the 
effects of innovations in mortgages and mortgage securities.77 
 Numerous personal incentives to buy property are prevalent in the US. 
Furthermore, these incentives are compounded by the systemic incentives 
presented in the previous chapter. The incentives on the homebuyer are closely 
related and in-line with the financial systems incentives which will be presented. 
                                                 
76 (McCulley 2009) 




CHAPTER FOUR: A CRASHING MARKET 
 The motivations presented in Chapters One and Two establish that 
borrowers were motivated by personal and systemic incentives to engaged in 
property purchases during the expansionary period. The subsequent chapters in 
Part One will discuss the incentives which influenced homebuyer’s decision to 
engage in behavior that crashed the market. This chapter examines how the house 
prices (property values) plateaued due to supply side growth and demand 
diminishing. The diminishing of house price appreciation was a catalyst for many 
borrowers to initially foreclose. The following chapters will discuss the 
involuntary reasons why homeowners were forced into foreclosure as well as a 
theory that supports voluntary default.  
GROWING DEBT BURDEN: 
From 1995 through the height of the housing market, households took on 
larger levels of mortgage debt. The debt burden from home mortgages rose from 
$200 billion to over $1 trillion at the height of the market (see Figure 5: 
Household Debt)78  
                                                 
78 Data from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2012 
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Figure 5: Household Debt 
 
THE CATALYST FOR COLLAPSE: 
 As long as supply and demand in the housing market kept pace with each 
other the boom was likely to continue. Housing values would continue to increase 
and the period of economic stability would continue. Housing starts began to 
outpace the number of homebuyers, even with historically easy access to credit, 
and home values were approaching a ceiling.  
Increasing prices in the housing market had a substantial supply-side 
effect with housing starts increasing dramatically.79 “By 2002, housing starts were 
almost 25 percent above the average rate over the three years immediately 
preceding the start of the bubble (1993-95).” In 2005 over 2 million new houses 
were constructed, far more than the historical average. An over-supply of rental 
housing was one of the first indications that supply was outpacing market demand 
(and capacity). In 2002 the vacancy rate in rental housing was just above nine 
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percent compared to an average 7.3 percent from (1993-95). 80 From 2005 on, 
vacancy in for-sale properties also began to increase. See Figure 6: 
Surplus/Shortage of Vacant Homes81 The vacancy rate on ownership units was 
almost 50 percent above its prior peak.82 
 
Figure 6: Surplus/Shortage of Vacant Homes 
 
 
                                                 
80 Baker, 2008 and Shiller, 2006 
81 Freddie Mac, 2015 
82 Baker, 2008 
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A collapse in house price appreciation started in spring 2006.83 As the 
supply of housing began to outpace demand prices became stagnant. When prices 
plateaued the first wave of foreclosures began. 
 Subsequent chapters will present the incentives that impacted a 
borrowers’ default. Two frameworks are relied upon to support the incentives and 
explain the foreclosure phase. Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis proposes 
that some borrowers were forced into default. In contrast, the option theory 
supports the notion that borrowers foreclosed because of a conscious rational 
decision. It is likely that both voluntary and involuntary defaults occurred, 
however, both voluntary and involuntary defaults are likely to be due to 
borrowing that put them risk to either voluntary or involuntary default.  
Initial defaults and foreclosures caused house prices to begin to decline 
sparking more defaults. Foreclosed properties went back on the market adding to 
the oversupply of housing and depressing values further.84 Foreclosures in one 
geographic area have been found to cause house price depreciation.85 When the 
pace of house price appreciation declines, some homeowners may lower their 
expectations about future house price appreciation, and hence may lower their 
demand for housing.86 
                                                 
83 Gerardi, et al., 2008 and Demyanyk and van Hemert, 2007, and Doms, Furlong, and 
Krainer, 2007 and Danis and Pennington-Cross, 2005 
84 Baker, 2008 
85 Schloemer, et al., 2006 
86 Doms, Furlong and Krainer, 2007 
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As defaults increased banks responded by increasing rates on existing 
ARM’s and by tightening credit markets for new originations. Borrowers were 
caught with higher payments and less access to credit and a market with an even 
greater supply of housing.87 Just as the conditions that grew the market were 
largely self-perpetuating the crashing markets had a positive-feedback loop as 
well. Foreclosures began to increase at a dramatic rate in late 2006 (see Figure 7: 
Foreclosures).88 
Figure 7: Foreclosures 
 
Vintage loans 2005 and 2006 were found to default in significantly higher 
numbers than loans originated prior to 2005 despite being relatively similar in 
                                                 
87 Baker, 2008, during crash credit market standards tightened, demanding 20 percent 
down and full documentation loans 
88 Zywicki and Okloski, 2009 
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observable characteristics.89 The average default rate on vintage 2006 loans 
exceeds the default rate on the riskiest category of loans originated in 2004.90 
Millions of Americans lost their homes during the downturn. 2007 saw 
foreclosure actions against 1.3 million properties.91 It was estimated that in 2008 
2.3m Americans would lose their homes and 3.4 million homeowners would 
default on their mortgages in 2009.92 
NEGATIVE HOME EQUITY: 
 During the market crash many homebuyers found they had negative equity 
in their homes. Factors that determine home equity are the down payment at 
origination, stripping away of equity through refinancing, and depreciating home 
prices. High loan-to-value ratios were presented as a reason homeowners were 
able to afford property in Chapter Two. As house prices fell, borrowers who had 
paid a 90 percent, or sometimes even an 80 percent down payment were left with 
negative value in their houses.93 Negative amortizing loans are also likely to result 
in negative home equity.  Deprecating home prices were presented earlier in this 
chapter.  
                                                 
89 2001 was also a particularly bad vintage. Gerardi, et al., 2008 and Demyanyk and Van 
Hemert, 2010 
90 Gerardi, et al., 2008 
91 Stiglitz, 2010 citing Moodys 
92 Stiglitz, 2010 citing Moodys 
93 Stiglitz, 2010 
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Home equity loans and mortgage refinancing led many homeowners to 
extract all their equity in their homes.94 High housing prices have also fostered 
consumer spending generally.95 As several recent studies have shown, households 
view the value of their homes as an important source of wealth for the future96 
When they see home values climb, they feel less need to save for the future. In 
addition, increases in home values allow households to directly increase their 
consumption by borrowing against their increased equity.
                                                 
94 Shefrin and Statman, 2011 
95 Baker, 2002 




CHAPTER FIVE: MINSKY’S FINANCING 
 There are two theoretical motivations for the collapse in the mortgage 
market; this chapter explores involuntary foreclosure. The three types of 
borrowers from Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis are used as a basis to 
explain involuntary foreclosure. Because of the binary nature of an involuntary 
outcome the incentive present in this case refers to the decisions borrowers made 
before the foreclosure event. These incentives were presented previously as 
reasons for a borrower to become highly leveraged. Involuntary foreclosure is 
simply a consequence of those actions.  
MINSKY MOMENT: 
Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis was notably applied to the 
mortgage crisis in McCuley (2009) and referred to as a “Minsky moment.97 
Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis98 provides a framework important to 
discussing different types of borrowers during the mortgage boom. Minsky 
describes three types of borrowers; hedge, speculative, and Ponzi. With hedge 
financing a borrower is able to cover interest and principal payments with current 
cash flow. Borrowers in this category are the lowest risk of default because they 
                                                 
97 The term “Minsky moment” was first used by Paul McCulley in McCulley 2009 
98 Minsky, 1992 
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have the ability to pay off mortgages regardless of the market value of the 
underlying property. Many borrowers, however, fall into the speculative category 
of financing. Speculative borrowers are able to cover some but not all of their 
contracted payments. These borrowers might have enough cash flow to cover 
interest payments but not enough to reduce their principal and will roll over 
maturing debt. Borrowers in this category require either property values to rise or 
interest rates to decrease. A third group of borrowers fall into the Ponzi financing 
category. Ponzi financing is similar to speculative but with negative amortization, 
these borrowers require refinancing or a sale of their house just to meet interest 
payments on a loan. 
During the expansionary period household debt rose dramatically while 
household income increased remained stagnant (See: Figure 8: Income and 
Debt).99 
                                                 
99 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
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Figure 8: Income and Debt 
 
Many borrowers in this market used the questionable financing practices 
based on speculation and even Ponzi financing.100 These borrowers are inherently 
risky because they rely on macroeconomic factors to continue servicing their debt. 
During the expansionary period with rising home values these borrowers were 
able to meet their payments by refinancing or selling the property. However, if 
home prices were stagnant or lost value homebuyers would not only be illiquid 
but also insolvent. This is the first of two of theorems in Minsky’s financial 
instability hypothesis.  
If hedge financing dominates, then the economy may well be an 
equilibrium seeking and containing system. In contrast, the greater 
the weight of speculative and Ponzi finance, the greater the 
likelihood that the economy is a deviation amplifying system.101 
                                                 
100 Shefrin and Statman, 2011 
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The second theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that over 
periods of prolonged prosperity, the economy transits from financial relations that 
make for a stable system to financial relations that make for an unstable system.102 
The period of economic stability and rising property values encouraged 
leveraging among borrowers. Highly leveraged borrowers were speculative or 
Ponzi in nature and when property values leveled off, large debt burdens backed 
by assets valued less than the debt forced them to default because their debt was 
structured such that values must increase for them to meet their financial 
obligations. Essentially the period of stability was destabilizing. Widespread 
defaults then sparked a collapse of asset values, further exacerbating the cycle.103  
Minsky supports the pro cyclical nature of behavior consistent with the 
euphoric markets and herd mentality presented in the previous chapter. Minsky 
insists that herd mentality and over-extrapolation of home prices encourages 
increasingly risky debt structures that ultimately undermine stability.  
Humans are not only momentum investors, rather than value 
investors, but also inherently both greedy and suffering from 
hubris about their own smarts. It’s sometimes called a bigger fool 
game, with each individual fool thinking he is slightly less foolish 
than all the other fools. And yes, a bigger fool game is also 
sometimes called a Ponzi Scheme.104  
 
                                                 
102 Minsky, 1992 
103 Minsky, 1992 
104 McCulley, 2009 
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The borrowers that defaulted due to overleveraged and unsustainable 
financing practices were overly susceptible to the home buying incentives 
presented in previous chapters. 
McCulley insists that during the expansionary period the primary 
motivation for borrowers was the supply of Ponzi credit rather than the interest 
elasticity of demand. Banks would only loan to Ponzi holders if they believed 
asset prices would continue to rise. 
PAYMENT SHOCK: 
Borrowers that were speculative or Ponzi in nature could be forced into 
default by a change in asset values. With adjustable rate mortgages borrowers 
could also be at risk to cash flow issues because of an unexpected uptick in 
mortgage payments.105 ARM loans are particularly susceptible to this structural 
shock as they put the borrower at risk to macroeconomic changes in interest rates. 
This is because ARM rates, after the two-year initial rate, float with market 
interest rate. As the housing bubble collapsed a credit crisis dramatically 
increased ARM rates. This was a significant factor in defaults during the collapse 
period. The mortgage debt service ratio (DSR) shows the percentage of disposable 
personal income that goes to mortgage debt service payments (See Figure 9: 
Mortgage Debt Service Ratio (1995-2008)106. 
                                                 
105 Schloemer, et al., 2006 
106 The Federal Reserve Board, 2015 
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Figure 9: Mortgage Debt Service Ratio (1995-2008) 
 
As the debt to income ratio increases, homeowners are left with a smaller 
liquidity buffer if rates increase loan payments. The DSR increases throughout the 
expansionary period putting borrowers at heightened risk to payment shock 
related default.  
However, the evidence from loan-level data shows that resets cannot 
account for a significant portion of the increase in foreclosures.107 Local economic 
conditions may affect lower credit quality borrowers more than high credit quality 
borrowers because weaker borrowers generally are thought to be more vulnerable 
to income or liquidity shocks that damage their ability to repay a loan. Therefore, 
                                                 
107 Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund, 2008 and Foote, Gerardi, Goette, and Willen, 2007 show 
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local economies that have suffered adverse economic shocks would be expected 
to have greater delinquency rates.108 
ADVERSE EVENTS: 
 Adverse events, such as unemployment and health problems, impact an 
individual’s income or expenses, changing cash flow needed for debt payments 
and may cause an individual to default on a mortgage due to events largely 
outside of their control. Many of these events (e.g. unemployment) are correlated 
with changes in the macro economy. The adverse events theory posits that these 
events cause foreclosures, however these are poor explanations for the recent 
crash: 
Adverse trigger events plainly cannot explain the record levels of 
foreclosures of recent years. Indeed, during the time that 
foreclosures skyrocketed, the economy remained relatively robust, 
with low unemployment and modest but positive economic 
growth.109  
 
The unemployment rate did not rise, but actually fell by .4 percentage points 
between 2005 and 2006.110 The mortgage collapse directly caused the economic 
crisis and recession, the inverse of what the adverse trigger events theory posits. 
Instead, defaults may be the result of payment shock or negative home equity.  
 
 
                                                 
108 Doms, Furlong and Krainer, 2007 
109 Zywicki and Okloski, 2009 




CHAPTER SIX: OPTION THEORY OF MORTGAGES 
While the previous chapter presented a view that foreclosure was 
involuntary, it is not a complete explanation for the foreclosures during the crash. 
This chapter explores voluntary foreclosure and is motivated by the options 
theory of mortgages. The voluntary option to default is based on the inherent 
economic incentive to make a rational decision on how to maximize monetary 
gain and minimize monetary loss. 
OPTION THEORY: 
Borrower’s decisions regarding paying a loan have long been discussed 
under an options model. The default option, a put option, can put the house back 
to the lender allowing the borrower to ‘keep’ the loan. A delinquency option 
essentially is the borrower borrowing again from the lender at a rate of the 
mortgage plus a penalty rate, which gives the borrower access to a line of credit. 
The final option, prepayment, is a call option where the bower can prepay a loan 
if credit rates fall. A borrower is likely to exercise a put or call option when it is in 
the money. 
Under the option theory of mortgages, a loan’s down payment determines 
how far out of the money the option is at inception. The down payment therefore 
provides a fundamental reason for a loan to be exercised in a specific way and 
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strongly supports the notion that home equity is the primary driver in loan 
defaults during the mortgage crisis.  
 
DELINQUENCY/LINE OF CREDIT: 
The delinquency option gives the borrower time to evaluate and fix their 
financial situation. In a delinquent state the loan will eventually end up in default, 
prepayment, or back on track. Borrowers face significant costs while being 
delinquent. Fees accrue over time, making it cost more over the long run to get a 
loan back on track. Delinquency will also appear on a credit report and will 
temporarily decrease a borrower’s credit score. This blemish on a record will 
diminish a borrower’s ability to take out loans in the future and increase the cost 
of future loans.  
 Despite these costs many borrowers take advantage of this line of credit to 
get a period of free rent, income/consumption smoothing, and time to alleviate a 
financial mess.111  
Delinquency rates decline with equity in the prime market but not in the 
low borrower credit score market, which indicates that delinquency is more like a 
short term borrowing option (line of credit) in the low borrower credit score 
market while being a prelude to foreclosure in the high borrower credit score 
market.112 In theory high quality borrowers have more to lose from delinquency 
                                                 
111 Ambrose, Buttimer, and Capone, 1997 
112 Cutts and Order, 2004 
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due to their better credit record. They also have greater access to credit markets, 
which should allow them to weather difficult financial times.113  
Delinquent loans can default or be refinanced to become current. When a 
loan is delinquent for a long time it will typically end in prepayment because the 
holder refinanced.114 The decision to become delinquent on a mortgage depends 
on both the ability and the willingness of the borrower to repay the loan.115  
PREPAYMENT/CALL OPTION: 
The call option allows a borrower to prepay a loan. This situation exists 
either when the house has positive equity and the borrower can sell the house or 
when the property can be refinanced at a lower rate.  
Borrowers have a strong incentive to refinance when rates drop or their 
credit quality improves due to significant rate differences between grades within 
the low borrower credit score market as well as between the low borrower credit 
score market and the high borrower credit score market. When interest rates fall, 
prime borrowers will more or less ruthlessly exercise their option to refinance into 
a lower rate mortgage.116  
Borrowers also have a strong incentive to refinance when they are 
struggling to stay current, or are delinquent, but have equity in the property. 117 A 
                                                 
113 Courchane, Surette, and Zorn, 2004 
114 Danis and Pennington-Cross, 2005 
115 Doms, Furlong and Krainer, 2007 and Baker, 2008 
116 Cutts and Order, 2004 
117 Danis and Pennington-Cross, 2005 and Doms, Furlong, and Krainer, 2007 
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positive equity position makes the borrower more likely to attempt to preserve 
such a position by selling rather than letting the property go into foreclosure. The 
borrower does not want to give the bank the value between the loan and equity in 
the house. The higher the home equity the greater the incentive to the borrower to 
keep their loan current.  
The increase in home values (and therefore home equity) during the 
expansionary period encouraged many borrowers to exercise the prepayment 
option with more favorable refinancing terms or to extract equity from the home 
value. The rising value environment also made loan performance strong as 
borrowers had a strong incentive to keep loans current. Strong house price growth 
increased the amount of equity in their homes and enabled them to refinance their 
mortgages despite being behind on the monthly payments.118  
An ability to exercise this option diminishes the propensity to default due 
to payment shock because a borrower with positive equity in a property will not 
only have a strong incentive to maintain the loan (for risk of losing the equity) but 
also will typically have options to refinance by stripping away a portion of the 
remaining equity to stay current on the loan.  
The prepayment/refinancing option was utilized heavily during the 
expansionary period. In 1997 only 8 percent of homeowners had refinanced at 
least once but beginning in 1999 the percentage had risen to 47 percent.119 
                                                 
118 Schloemer, et al. 2006 





Homeowners in strong housing markets have greater incentive to keep the 
mortgage current; if there is a potential capital gain on the house and if you 
default, you also risk giving up some or even all of that capital gain. Risky 
borrowers can be bailed out by strong house price appreciation; likewise, 
relatively safe borrowers may still default if the adverse shock to house prices is 
severe enough.  If home values fall sufficiently to put the market value of a 
property below the loan value borrowers will ruthlessly exercise their option to 
default.120  
The put option gives the borrower the ability to put the house back to the 
lender. Due to the non-recourse nature of loans in the United States the lender 
cannot force the borrower to repay the loan value, they must accept the home in 
its current market value state.121 Because of the non-recourse nature of most US 
mortgages a borrower can default and save the difference between the loan 
amount and the value of their home. The theoretical motivation to exercise the put 
option therefore is based on the loan-to-market value of the property,122 even if 
the borrower had the funds to make loan payments.  
                                                 
120 Cutts and Order, 2004 
121 Stiglitz, 2010 
122 When a borrower now owes more to the bank than the house is worth: the house is 
‘underwater’. 
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Under the option theory of foreclosure default is strategic decision based 
on incentives inherent with changes in asset value. Default is both voluntary and 
rational for the borrower because the borrower could continue to pay the loan but 
chooses not to. 123 
Ruthless/frictionless default is when borrowers give the property rights in 
exchange for release from the mortgage obligation whenever the market value of 
the mortgage exceeds the value of the underlying property. The degree to which 
borrowers exercise ruthless/ frictionless default is highly debated.124  
Kenneth Lewis of Bank of America believes that “cash-strapped 
borrowers now believe bailing out on a house is one of the easier ways to get their 
finances back under control.”125 Bank of America observed that borrowers would 
default on mortgage debt first before falling behind on other forms of debt (car 
payments, credit cards, etc.). Lewis attributes this largely to changing social 
norms. For a borrower with a high loan to value ratio they may not have positive 
equity in their home: it would be easy to default on a home first, rather than other 
forms of debt. The mortgage debt would disappear and they would have lost 
relatively little.  
 In a macroeconomic environment with widespread underwater homes it is 
likely that borrowers can simply default on their mortgage and move into an 
                                                 
123 Stiglitz, 2010. Stiglitz refers to this as an economically rational decision.  
124 Ambrose, Capone and Deng, 2001 
125 Anders, 2007 
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identical neighboring house, alleviating their financial mess. Stiglitz reminds us 
that the borrower “might hesitate, worrying about what walking away would do to 
his credit reputation. But with everyone going into default, the stigma was likely 
to be muted.” Herd mentality is present here as well, making it seem okay to 
default on an underwater home regardless of one’s solvency.  
Empirical studies traditionally have tended to support the option theory of 
foreclosure. Empirical results confirm that loan to value ratios have been found to 
be an important factor in mortgage delinquency prior to the market crash in 2007 
and support the notion that the home price collapse was the source of the crisis.126 
This can be seen in a correlation between lower default rates where real estate 
prices have increased.127 Foreclosures are more likely in housing markets with 
lower house price growth128 Locations that saw declines in prices exhibited higher 
levels of delinquency and default.129 High loan to value ratios were the most 
important observable risk factor that increased over the period.130 And patterns in 
recent house price appreciation are far and away the best single predictor of 
delinquency levels131 This explains why later vintage year loans performed worse 
                                                 
126 Danis and Pennington-Cross, 2005 and Gerardi, et al., 2008 and Demyanyk and van 
Hemert, 2007  
127 Zywicki and Okloski, 2009  
128 Schloemer, et al., 2006 
129 Doms, Furlong, and Krainer, 2007 and Ambrose, Capone, and Deng, 2001 
130 Gerardi, Shapiro and Willen, 2008 and Gerardi, et al., 2008 and Demyanyk and Van 
Hemert, 2010 
131 Doms, Furlong and Krainer, 2007 
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than other vintages, despite being relatively similar in other observable 
characteristics.132 
While all homebuyers during in this period were subject to large swings in 
home values, a specific group of loan products allowed buyers to be particularly 
at risk to negative home equity. Many borrowers took on low or no-down 
payment loans. These borrowers were particularly susceptible to negative home 
equity from the beginning of their loan because the loan had no buffer against 
negative equity. Interest only loans had a similar problem because borrowers 
never accrue any equity if they only make interest payments.133 Many loans were 
offered with both low/no down payment and interest only payment schedules. 
Low down payment loans are correlated with heightened default rates.134 High 
loan to value lending accounts for roughly 10 percent of originations in 2000, 
rising to over 50 percent by 2006.135 One study found that conventional 
mortgages with loan to value ratios at origination of 91–95 percent were twice as 
likely to default as loans with loan to value of 81–90 percent and five times more 
likely to default than those with loan to value of 71–80 percent.136  
                                                 
132 Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2010 
133 Zywicki and Okloski, 2009   
134 Zywicki and Okloski, 2009   
135 Gerardi, et al., 2008 
136 Doms, Furlong, and Krainer, 2007 and Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen, 2008 and 
Ambrose, Capone, and Deng, 2001 
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Loan to value ratios might be the primary reason why vintage loans 2005 
and 2006 are found to default in significantly higher numbers than loans 
originated prior to 2005.137 The average default rate on vintage 2006 loans 
exceeds the default rate on the riskiest category of loans originated in 2004.138 As 
house prices fell even borrowers who had paid a 90 percent, or sometimes even an 
80 percent down payment were left with negative value in their homes.139 These 
findings suggest that the amount of equity in one’s home is the primary 
consideration in a homebuyer’s propensity to default.  
Similar to serial refinancers, borrowers who took out a home equity line of 
credit against equity that accumulated during the boom also defaulted in higher 
numbers.140  These borrowers stripped away at equity making them more 
susceptible to negative home equity. “Negative equity for homes in foreclosure 
are more often the result of post-purchase cash-out refinancing or home equity 
loans are more responsible for the presence of negative equity than housing price 
declines.”141  
Loans during the expansionary period were safe only if house prices kept 
rising, giving owners an increasing capital cushion, however it should have been 
                                                 
137 2001 was also a particularly bad vintage. Gerardi, et al., 2008 and Demyanyk and Van 
Hemert, 2010 
138 Gerardi, et al., 2008 
139 Stiglitz, 2010 
140 Zywicki and Okloski, 2009 
141 LaCour-Little, Rosenblatt and Yao, 2008 
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fairly evident that this was unsustainable. The empirical evidence on the impact of 
house price depreciation on default rates is consistent with the theoretical model 
of options and tends to indicate that this is the primary motivation impacting a 
borrower’s propensity to default during the mortgage crash.  
Homebuyers are rational and behaved logically to the rational incentives 
or maximizing gain and minimizing loss. During this period the result was 
widespread foreclosure.  
While Chapters Five and Six portray involuntary and voluntary defaults as 
explicitly different they include a significant amount of similarity in how and why 
a borrower would fall into one situation versus the other. The conditions which 
predicate a borrower becoming a speculative borrower from a previous hedge 
position, or borrowers who initially engaged in speculative finance, in some cases 
decided to default voluntarily because that was economically more efficient due 
to the “underwater” home value.  The line between voluntary and involuntary 







PART TWO: THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
While homebuyers made a conscious decision to borrow, sometimes on a 
speculative or Ponzi basis, and subsequently defaulted on their loans, the financial 
system allowed borrowers access to a credit market and also created the 
inherently risky products that homebuyers took advantage of during the 
expansionary period. Part Two discusses the incentives for financial 
intermediaries and presents a logical basis for their role in the boom and bust. 
Chapter Seven presents how Federal Reserve interest rate policy provided 
stimulus to restart the economy after the 2001 dot-com market crash and was a 
catalyst for the increase in mortgage originations. Chapter Eight highlights an 
important systemic change from an originate and hold lending model to originate 
and distribute, which dramatically transformed the financial system and was 
imperative to the expansionary period. Chapter Nine will discuss how the 
financial system transitioned from strong performance to a rapid crash. Chapter 
Ten focuses on the mortgage originator, the entity most influenced by incentives. 
Chapter Eleven concludes part Two by highlighting inherent problems with other 






CHAPTER SEVEN: A MACROECONOMIC DRIVER 
 The exuberant growth of mortgage lending at the beginning of the 
expansionary period can be traced directly to government actions taken to offset 
the economic downturn stemming from the stock market slide which began in late 
2000. The NASDAQ, for instance, trading at 4234 on September 1, 2000, 
dropped 46 percent to trade at 2292 on Jan 2, 2001, and continued to devalue 
through 2002.142 In an effort to stave off recession, the Federal Government 
turned to the Federal Reserve (FED) for help. The FED has the ability to 
indirectly affect lending rates to Americans. Interest rate changes have long been 
a tool used to control business cycles, reigning in excessive growth and 
stimulating a stagnant economy. While interest rate changes helped stimulate the 
economy in general, they also had a direct and significant impact on the mortgage 
industry in 2001 because of their effect on the incentive to borrow and finance 
property. 
FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY: 
Through manipulation of interest rates the FED has a powerful tool to 
send signals to borrowers and investors. While interest rate policy cannot mandate 
that consumers and investors behave in a certain way, this macro tool has a 
                                                 
142 Data from Yahoo Finance 
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significant impact on changing the incentive structure present in the financial 
system.  
 In an aggressive but not unprecedented rate drop, The FED funds target 
rate was cut from 5-6 percent in 2000 to under 2 percent by the end of 2001.143  
FED policy was largely guided by the recession during the dot-com bust and 
housing in particular was targeted to reinvigorate the economy. Paul Krugman 
explains:  
To reflate the economy, the Fed doesn't have to restore business 
investment; any kind of increasing demand will do. How might 
demand increased? Consumers, who already have low savings and 
high debt, probably can't contribute much. But housing, which is 
highly sensitive to interest rates, could help lead the recovery.144  
 
The idea to stimulate housing as a way out of the dot-com recession was 
supported by many. Paul McCulley of PIMCO supported the notion that Alan 
Greenspan needed to create a housing bubble to replace the NASDAQ bubble.145 
Many in government supported this move including the sitting president George 
W. Bush who stated “I'm am pleased the Fed has cut interest rates. I believe the 
cut was needed. It's a strong statement to ensure our economy does not go into a 
tailspin.” 146  
 
                                                 
143 Data from Fedpimerate.com 
144 Hammond, 2012 
145 Hammond, 2012 
146 Money, 2001 
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MORTGAGE INTEREST RATES: 
The FED rate cut had a direct impact on mortgage interest rates. As seen 
in Figure 10: Interest Rates,147 both adjustable and fixed rate mortgage products 
saw a significant reduction in interest rates.   
Figure 10: Interest Rates 
 
A core motivation for increased borrowing in Part One was an expansion 
of the availability and affordability of credit to homebuyers including those with 
low credit scores. Figure 11: Interest Rates by Credit Score,148 shows that interest 
rates became favorable for borrowers in all credit score categories.  
                                                 
147 LoanPerformance ABS securities data base of subprime loans 
148 LoanPerformance ABS securities data base of subprime loans 
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Figure 11: Interest Rates by Credit Score 
 
The interest rates on the riskiest loans by credit score became lower than 
rates on the safest loans by credit score prior to 2001. Lowering the interest rates 
for the riskiest (by credit score) borrowers made loans more affordable for 
borrowers with bad credit; in other words, the most at risk of a future default had 
increasingly easy access to loans.  
During the expansionary period borrowers became highly levered through 
the use of low/no down payment mortgages. These loans were important to 
reducing the up-front financial burden on homebuyers. Figure 12:Interest Rates 
by Loan to Value,149 shows that lending was favorable to borrowers with high 
loan to value ratios.  
                                                 
149 LoanPerformance ABS securities data base of subprime loans 
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Figure 12:Interest Rates by Loan to Value 
 
Loans with the highest loan-to-value ratios were available at interest rates 
comparable to the lowest loan-to-value ratios prior to 2001. Even loans with a 
value greater than the asset they backed eventually dipped below the rates on 
standard 20 percent down mortgages prior to 2001.  
STIMULATED BORROWING: 
The easing of interest rates for all types of loans (credit score, loan-to-
value, adjustable vs. fixed, etc.) acted as a macroeconomic lever effecting the 
systemic incentive for Americans to borrow. While a number of other incentives 
enticed individuals to purchase property during the expansionary period, 
favorable interest rates were the catalyst to the period and the core of the 
homebuyer’s systemic motivation. Mortgage origination began to accelerate in 
2001 as rates began to fall, and originations continued to grow as interest rates fell 
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further throughout the expansionary period. See Figure 13: Single Family 
Mortgage Originations.150 
Figure 13: Single Family Mortgage Originations 
 
In Figure 14: The Housing Bubble and Credit Access we can see how, 
with some lag, fed interest rates influenced housing prices.151 
 
                                                 
150 Freddie Mac, 2015 
151 Beachy, 2012 
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Figure 14: The Housing Bubble and Credit Access 
 
 
Without interest rate manipulation, borrowing would not have been as 
favorable and recovery from the stock market recession would not have been as 
swift. The goal of rejuvenating a depressed economy through interest rate changes 
and targeting housing seemed to work.152 See Figure 15: Annual GDP Growth 
(1997-2004).153 
                                                 
152 Baker, 2008 
153 Data from database: World Development Indicators 
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Figure 15: Annual GDP Growth (1997-2004) 
 
Stiglitz asserts that, for Americans who took equity out of their homes, 
this had “sustained the American economy– and to a large extent the global 
economy” but remained a “debt– financed consumption binge supported by a 
housing bubble.”154 Low interest rates provide the necessary push to rejuvenate 
the economy through increased mortgage origination. As discussed in Part One 
during the period from 2001-2005 favorable rates were instrumental in getting 
individuals into housing. The ability to refinance or take out home equity loans 
due to low rates also allowed Americans to maintain or increase consumption 
despite stagnating or declining income.  
ISSUES WITH FEDERAL INTEREST RATES:  
Alan Greenspan’s lowering of rates in the wake of the dot-com crash 
served its intended purpose, to restart the economy. There is no doubt that the 
Federal Reserve interest rate policy, led first by Chairman Alan Greenspan and 
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later by Ben Bernanke, also contributed to the enormous growth of the subprime 
market.155 The low interest rate environment gave a strong incentive to 
homebuyers to leverage household finances and buy property or utilize a home 
equity line of credit to finance consumption. Perhaps that incentive was too strong 
or sustained for too long.  
Many say the interest rate policy went too far and may have been a 
fundamental contributor to the bubbles collapse. As early as 2001, Congressman 
Ron Paul warned of an impending bubble and identified housing as its potential 
sector. Throughout expansionary period, Paul continually voiced his concern that 
the boom was being fed by an increase in supply of money.156 Stiglitz, also 
concerned over the government policy writes: 
Regulators stood back and let it all happen, they not only claimed 
that they couldn’t tell whether there was a bubble until after it 
broke, but also said that even if they had been able to, there was 
nothing they could do about it. They were wrong on both counts.157  
 
While Bernanke inherited a bubble in the making, he also came to office 
while Wall Street was enjoying record profits and many Americans were 
purchasing their first homes. If he tried to stop some of the reckless real estate 
lending and the complex securitization, he would be blamed for bringing down 
the economy. On the contrary, perhaps Greenspan did not believe there was a 
                                                 
155 Mayer and Hubbard, 2008. Although it was one of many factors.  
156 Hammond, 2012 
157 Stiglitz, 2010. and Chomsisengphet, 2006. Stiglitz believed that more than just the 
regulators of interest rate policy were at fault.  
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bubble, or did not believe policy measures could have deflated the bubble 
gradually and that it would be easier to fix things after it popped. The Fed did 
engage in seventeen consecutive interest rate hikes between June 2004 and June 
2006,158 but these seemed to have little impact on the bubbles continued 
formation.  
There is no doubt that interest rate policy changes during the expansionary 
period could have served to quell the over exuberant markets. Why they did not is 
a significantly more complicated question. The Government after all was 
following their own best course of action. There was a strong logical reason to 
lower rates at the beginning and also many incentives in failing to raise them 
during the expansionary period. Questioning if the bubble existed, the political 
climate during the expansionary period, as well as hesitation if raising interest 
rates aggressively was the best move to make are all significant incentives that 
impacted government policy during the period. 
 
  
                                                 




CHAPTER EIGHT: A SYSTEMIC CHANGE 
 At the same time that interest rate policy changes at the beginning of the 
expansionary period stimulated the incentives for borrowing and lending in the 
macro economy, financial innovation fundamentally changed the mortgage 
market. A systemic institutional change had profound effects on the mortgage 
market when the financial system moved away from the conventional originate 
and hold lending model and adopted the originate and distribute (OTD) model. 
The change also brought with it peculiar incentives to the financial players in the 
market. In the last chapters of this thesis, the reaction to the incentives faced by 
financial players, both institutions and individuals, will provide a logic for the 
financial systems aggressive support for the mortgage market expansion and how 
logical reactions to the incentives also injected significant risks into the mortgage 
market. This chapter presents an overview of the OTD model of lending and the 
benefits it presented to each participant in the mortgage market. 
THE RISE OF ORIGINATE AND DISTRIBUTE: 
In the originate and hold model a lender deals directly with a potential 
homebuyer to issue a loan. The originating entity will hold the loan on its books 
for the life of the debt. The originating bank must have sufficient capital to issue 
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the loan and will also hold the default risk for the life of the loan. Profits are 
generated through interest accrued from lending.  
Under an originate and distribute model the mortgage originator issues a 
loan but instead of holding the loan on its books, the loan is sold to a financial 
intermediary. The financial intermediary repackages mortgages by pooling them 
together and dividing the pool into portions called tranches. The tranches become 
investments (mortgage-backed securities or MBS) and are sold to investors 
worldwide through a secondary exchange. This systemic change ushered in a 
dramatic increase in lending due the numerous incentives it presented to each 
entity involved, in particular deep rate reduction for primary lenders and 
investment vehicles for investors in the booming real estate sector. 
While a secondary mortgage market had been around for close to forty 
years, the acceptance of OTD lending caused the securitization of mortgages grow 
rapidly from 1995 through the peak of the housing market (see Figure 16: 
Securitization 1980-2009).159  
                                                 
159 Rosen, 2010 
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Figure 16: Securitization 1980-2009 
 
Securitization rates (the ratio of the dollar-value of loans securitized 
divided by the dollar-value of loans originated) grow from under 30 percent in 
1995 to over 80 percent in 2006,160 Securitization was popular with all loan 
categories, (see Figure 17: Securitization Rates161). The “subprime”162 loan 
securitization rate grew from less than 30 percent in 1995 to over 58 percent in 
2003, and the conventional securitization rate increased from 50 percent in 1995-
97 to more than 75 percent in 2003. 
 
 
                                                 
160 Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig, 2010 
161 Data from Chomsisengphet, 2006. Original source, Inside MBS and ABS. Subprime 
securities include both MBS and ABS back by subprime loans. Securitization rate equal 
securities issue divided by originations in dollars.  
162 See section: SUBPRIME for a definition of subprime loans used in this paper.  
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Figure 17: Securitization Rates 




e 1995 101.1  45.6  23.9  28.4 
1996  98.1  52.5  21.3  39.5 
1997  100.7  45.9  32.1  53.0 
1998  102.3  62.2  37.6  55.1 
1999  88.1  67.0  30.1 37.4 
2000  89.5  55.6  18.0  40.5 
2001  102.5   71.5  31.4  54.7 
2002  92.6  72.8  32.0  57.6 
2003  94.9  75.9  35.1  58.7 
 
ORIGINATION: 
A primary benefit of securitization for the mortgage originator is 
mitigating default risk by moving loans off lender balance sheets and into the 
hands of investors. Every loan has a number of embedded risks, such as interest 
rate risk and default risk. The originator, not wanting to hold these risks, can 
offload the loans to an investor who is looking for fixed income flows. This 
scenario is mutually beneficial for the originating bank as well as the investor. By 
having the option to move a mortgage off of their books through a liquid 
secondary market originators are able better to adjust their risk profile.163 During 
the expansionary period mortgage originators increasingly preferred to take a fee 
for originating and servicing the loan instead of holding the risk and receiving 
interest payments.164 By 2006, 60 percent of outstanding U.S. mortgage debt was 
traded in mortgage-backed securities (MBS).165 
                                                 
163 Jiangli and G., 2008 and Casu, Clare, Sarkisyan, and Thomas, 2010 
164 Rajan, 2005 
165 Chomsisengphet, 2006 
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Because originators move loans off their balance sheets, changes in 
origination volume have a small impact on bank balance sheets except for the 
need to temporarily hold mortgages while the sale process takes place. 
Essentially, the originate and distribute model allowed investors to buy 
repackaged mortgages debt thus providing financial banking to originate loans 
rather financing loans exclusively with bank deposits. This served as a massive 
liquidity injection into the mortgage market. Institutional investors became as 
important as commercial banks at providing credit to the U.S. economy.166 
Because investors in mortgage backed securities are from all over the world, 
liquidity in the mortgage market during the boom was largely based on global 
liquidity rather than local liquidity or the Federal Reserve rate.167 
Liquid securitization markets make it easy for banks to hold loans they 
originate for a short period of time. The originate and distribute model of lending 
offers flexibility to adjust the volume of mortgages originated quickly without 
having to make large adjustments to equity capital or asset portfolio.168 
Securitization completely transformed the origination of loans by 
controlling risk to the lenders and increasing the available liquidity to lend out as 
well as making it relatively easy for lenders to adjust lending. 
 
                                                 
166 Singh and Bruning, 2011 
167 Rajan, 2005  
168 Rosen, 2010 
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SECURITIZATION: 
Loans from originating institutions are securitized by investment banks 
and then sold to investors. Investment banks act as a financial intermediary and 
receive fees for restructuring illiquid loans into liquid products traded on a 
secondary exchange. Mortgage-backed securities are issued by government-
sponsored entities (such as Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae, and Freddie Mac) or private 
financial firms (such as Countrywide Financial, Wells Fargo, Bear Stearns, 
Lehman Brothers, and Goldman Sachs). The bulk of securitized mortgages ($3.6 
in January 2006) has been comprised of “agency” (government-sponsored) pools 
while the remainder ($2.1 trillion as of January 2006) has been securitized in 
“non-agency” (private) securities. 169 
Once a loan is repackaged and moved off the books, the investment bank, 
much like the originating bank, is clear of the default risk, which is now in the 
hands of investors where it will ultimately stay.170  
Securities are structured in a variety of ways and can become very 
complex, however, all mortgage-backed securities have two basic tenets that 
spread risk and make them an attractive investable asset: pooling and tranching. 
Though a standardization of contractual terms mortgages can be pooled together 
                                                 
169 Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig, 2010 
170 Stiglitz, 2010. While the investment banks kept some of the securities in special 
investment vehicles off their balance sheets most were purchased by investors. Typical 
investors of mortgage-backed securities were pension funds, hedge funds (which 
typically levered themselves). 
 69 
into a diversified bundle.171 The pool structure makes investing in mortgages less 
risky because default risk is spread throughout the pool. Pool performance is 
theoretically more predictable than the performance of any individual asset.172 
Moody’s generally projected that ~10 percent of the individual loans would 
fail.173 Instead of risking holding onto a single mortgage that might default, 
leaving you valueless, owning a pool of mortgages would give you, if Moody’s 
predictions were correct, 90 percent of the value.  
Pooling offers advantages through the dilution of risk and also through 
diversification. Pools can diversify by holding assets with a variety of different 
characteristics such as assets from different geographical regions. Because local 
banks lend mostly to members of their community if a large employer in that 
community shuts down, moves, or natural disaster strikes, it would have a 
significant impact on the borrower’s ability to pay (adverse events). Borrowers in 
this geographic region would be unable to meet their mortgage payments and the 
bank might risk going bankrupt. Convention said that it was unlikely that 
mortgages from dissimilar geographical regions would experience problems at the 
same time.174 Other ways to theoretically diversify bundles of mortgages would 
be to include assets with different loan structures or credit quality. Some 
                                                 
171 Rajan, 2005 
172 Rajan, 2005 
173 Sloan, 2007 
174 Stiglitz, 2010 
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securities were even made up by bundling multiple pools of diversified securities, 
creating what is called a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) or bundling 
multiple CDOs to create a CDO2. 
It is said that pooling reduces adverse selection - the probability that a 
seller cherry picks the bad assets to sell. Since the performance of a pool is more 
predictable than the performance of any individual asset, the buyer (and the 
market) can attribute underperformance of the pool to misbehavior by the seller. 
Since sellers are typically repeat sellers in this market, this is thought to be 
enough to keep them honest, and refrain from selling a disguised pool of 
“losers.”175  
The pool of mortgages is then divided up into pieces, called tranches, 
allowing the risk of default to be stratified. Tranching is done for the: 
Same reason Tyson Foods offers you chicken pieces rather than 
insisting you buy an entire bird.  Tyson can slice a chicken into 
breasts, legs, thighs, giblets –and lord knows what else –and get 
more for the pieces than it gets for the whole chicken. Customers 
are happy because they get only the pieces they want.176 
 
Investment banks divide up pools of mortgages into tranches and sell the 
pieces to investors. Each tranche is given an interest rate according to its risk of 
default. A basic MBS payout structure might have a highly risky first loss tranche 
absorbing the first 3 percent of the losses, a mezzanine tranche absorbing the 
following 3 to 7 percent of losses, and a senior tranche absorbing any remaining 
                                                 
175 Sloan, 2007. Theoretically this logic could be applied to the originators on loan quality 
as well.  
176 Sloan, 2007 
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loss. 177 This structure shields investors in the senior tranche from losses until they 
exceed 7 percent of the notional amount of the assets. Cash flow from securities 
can also be structured “differing in liquidity, maturity, contingency, and risk, each 
of which appeals to a particular clientele.”178  
Essentially Investment banks were providing investments that investors 
wanted, and attempted to stay neutral in their market position179 while increasing 
efficiency in the mortgage market. There is a saying on Wall Street that when the 
ducks quack, feed them. The investment banks helped the originators feed the 
investors and in turn provided originators the benefits of being free of default risk 
and flush with additional liquidity.  
GOVERNMENT BACKED SECURITIES: 
 Created by congress under the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, quasi-private firms (government-sponsored entities or GSE) such 
as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were sponsored to increase lending to higher risk 
borrowers.  
                                                 
177 Rajan, 2005 
178 Rajan, 2005 
179 While outside the scope of this paper, investment banks must hedge their position 
during the time that mortgages remain on their books while repackaging and selling the 
assets. A number of complex derivative transactions were utilized to accomplish this and 
have been the subject of scrutiny during the credit crisis.  
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Government interaction directly in the housing market was no new 
concept. Expanding homeownership rates historically has been a “linchpin” of 
American financial and social policy.180 Ron Paul explains: 
Ever since the 1930s, the federal government has involved itself 
deeply in housing policy and developed numerous programs to 
encourage homebuilding and homeownership. Government 
sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were able to 
obtain a Monopoly position in the mortgage market, especially the 
mortgage-backed securities market because of the government. 
Laws passed by Congress such as the Community Reinvestment 
Act required banks to make loans to previously underserved 
segments of their communities, thus forcing banks to lend to 
people who normally would be rejected as a bad credit risks.181 
 It should be noted that Ron Paul’s opinion differs from that of many 
other, notably including the Harvard Center for Housing Studies and Paul 
Krugman. 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac received $13.6 billion worth of indirect 
federal subsidies in 2000. 182 With government sponsorship comes an explicit 
promise by the treasury to bail out these GSE’s in times of economic difficulty. 183  
The government use of GSEs served as a massive injection of liquidity to the 
market. Furthermore, relaxed lending standards allowed lending specifically to 
the riskiest borrowers in the US.  Although, many opinions, both pro and con, 
                                                 
180 Zywicki and Okloski, 2009. Due to a belief that the “benefits of widespread 
homeownership outweigh the costs” 
181 Hammond, 2012 
182 Hammond, 2012 
183 Hammond, 2012 
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exist regarding GSEs and the CRA. Both are largely promoted due to the 
American Dream’s focus on property ownership.  
In contrast to Ron Paul’s view the “vast majority of subprime lending to 
lower – income borrowers and neighborhoods was outside the requirements and 
scrutiny of the CRA:” 184  
Banks didn’t engage in lending in their assessment areas, they did 
so at a lower rate then the market in general and accounted for only 
a small fraction of subprime loans to lower – income borrowers 
and lower – income neighborhoods. The data suggests that far 
from being forced into risky corners of the market, the institutions 
under the scrutiny of the CRA were crowded out by unregulated 
lenders.185 
 INVESTING: 
Investors widely saw mortgage-backed securities as a good product. The 
risk to an investor was diluted through the pool structure of securitization and 
tranching made products that fit every risk profile, the mortgage market was hot, 
and yields were good.  Generally, MBSs are traded actively, much like bonds are, 
so there is very little liquidity risk, especially in the case of MBS’ that originated 
from the GSEs, which are especially enticing to investors due to an implicit or 
explicit government guarantee.186 Non-agency securities have no such guarantee, 
however, private MBS were considered an extremely safe investment, often said 
to have the same credit worthiness as treasuries but with a return 1-2 percent 
greater. 
                                                 
184 Park, 2008 
185 Park, 2008 
186 Hammond, 2012 and Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig, 2010 
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The vast majority of tranches in non-agency deals carry triple-A 
ratings, and credit risk (i.e., the risk that all principal will not be 
returned) is channeled to a small percentage of lower-rated 
tranches by cash flow rules that are designed to protect the 
“senior” higher rated bonds.187 
 
 These securities are primarily used to provide safe income. Furthermore, rating 
agencies confirmed the safety and gave MBS’ high ratings.188  
A substantial reason the MBS investors bought in was due to high ratings 
from the three rating agencies, Standard & Poor's (S&P), Moody's, and Fitch 
Group. Credit rating agencies play a vital role by certifying the safety of many 
investable assets. MBS’ in general received very high ratings, many rated AAA, 
as high as a treasury bond. 
The early MBS’ were created during a booming period in housing and 
performed very well. Not surprisingly, investors clamored for more. Mortgage-
backed securities were the largest segment of the US bond market189. During the 
expansionary period the U.S. secondary mortgage market became the largest 




                                                 
187 Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig, 2010 
188 More on rating agencies in the next section. 
189 Schloemer, et al., 2006 
190 Chomsisengphet, 2006  
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BENEFITS TO BORROWERS:  
Strong market conditions that prevailed since 2000, allowed for exotic and 
potentially risky loan structures to develop and gain in popularity.191 These 
structures, presented in Part One, allowed for more affordable loans.  Borrowers 
were also able to put less and less equity into their homes when financing and 
loan-to-value ratios skyrocketed due to the market’s better appetite for risk.192  
Liquidity and risk sharing allowed originators to lend to more risky 
borrowers, who were underserved previously. The ability to spread risk and the 
increase in added liquidity not only meant that banks were lending to high credit 
score borrowers, but began to increase lending to low credit score borrowers as 
well.193 By spreading risk to investors, the risk bearing capacity of economies is 
increased and originators were ultimately able to make loans to riskier 
borrowers.194 Banks also switched from targeting the high credit score borrowers 
to the low credit score market to maintain loan volume.195  
Low borrower credit score lending is a relatively new and rapidly growing 
segment of the mortgage market that expands the pool of credit to borrowers who, 
for a variety of reasons, would otherwise be denied credit. 196  For instance, those 
                                                 
191 Gramlich, 2007 
192 Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig, 2010 
193 Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig, 2010 
194 Rosen, 2010 and Purnanandam, 2010 and Rajan, 2005) 
195 Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig, 2010 
196 Bostic, Calem, and Wachter, 2005 and Nichols, Pennington-Cross, and Yezer, 2005 
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potential borrowers who would fail credit history requirements in the standard 
(prime) mortgage market have greater access to credit in the low borrower credit 
score market. Two of the major benefits of this type of lending are the increased 
number of homeowners and the opportunity for these homeowners to create 
wealth by building equity in their property. Low borrower credit score lending 
was especially prevalent in neighborhoods with high concentrations of minorities 
and weaker economic conditions.197 Securitization, and low borrower credit score 
debt, is partially responsible for the increase in homeownership by 6 percent 
during the boom.198  Loans from first-time purchases have gone up to 38 percent 
post-2000 from 28 percent pre-2000. 199 Inside B&C Lending – a publication 
which covers low borrower credit score mortgage lending extensively – reports 
that total “subprime”200 lending (B&C originations) has grown from $65 billion in 
1995 to $500 billion in 2005.”201  
                                                 
197 Calem, Hershaff, and Wachter, 2004 and Chomsisengphet, 2006 
198 Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig, 2010 
199 Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig, 2010 
200 See section: SUBPRIME for a definition of subprime lending used in this paper.  




CHAPTER NINE: FROM BOOM TO CRASH 
Through the first quarter of 2007 the mortgage market remained strong. 
Firms were profitable, investments performed well, and affordable credit was 
accessible to Americans. The expansionary market was a reaction to each 
individual and institutional incentives. While this market was building, there were 
many incentives that led to a housing and mortgage market that was on the 
precipice of collapse. This chapter will explore how the financial system turned 
from strong performance to crisis while the subsequent chapters will highlight 
specific behavior in the financial systems key entities that put the market in a 
position susceptible to a crash.  
A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE: 
During the expansionary period the financial system experienced a 
significant positive feedback loop. Access to credit allowed buyers into the 
market and thus increased asset prices. Rising asset prices supported mortgage 
performance making mortgage-backed securities perform well. Strong 
performance in securities markets flooded the lending market with capital 
allowing and encouraging originators to issue more loans. The cycle repeated 
itself. 
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During the expansionary period financial markets showed almost no signs 
of an impending disaster. By 2006 signs that housing markets were unsound 
began to show. The rate of increase in home prices had slowed to close to zero 
and defaults on low borrower credit score adjustable-rate mortgages began to 
rise.202 However, other measures of financial stability remained stable. “Corporate 
bond spreads and the Chicago Board Options Exchange’s volatility index (the 
VIX) were still at very low values by historical standards.”203 Securitization 
markets continued strong performance with small haircuts on securitized bonds in 
the repurchase market.204Market metrics provide an indication of the confidence 
in the economy at the time. While select individuals and institutions raised red 
flags market metrics suggest that most did not see an impending disaster ahead. 
In 2007 when the mortgage market began to quickly deteriorate, total 
mortgage lending amounted to $14,560 billion and 50 percent of US mortgages 
were funded via securitization.205 When mortgages, particularly those of the 
riskier variety began to perform poorly, investors took notice.  
As long as the secondary loan market had enough demand, banks were 
able to off-load their originated loans without any disruption. The delay from 
                                                 
202 Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2010 
203 Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2010 
204 Gorton and Metrick, 2009. Haircuts measure the excess collateral a firm must offer to 
use a particular security as collateral. A 10 percent haircut would mean that a firm could 
only borrow $90 for every $100 of collateral it offered. 
205 Bank, 2008 
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origination to the final sale of these loans did not impose significant credit risk on 
the originating banks during normal periods. The year 2007 saw a reduction in 
investor demand in the secondary mortgage market, leaving banks sitting on 
disproportionately large amounts of mortgages they had originated with intent to 
distribute. The problem was magnified for banks with higher securitization rates. 
Liquidity constraints in the secondary markets as well as poor performance of 
loans held on originators books caused several bankruptcy filings from originators 
during the first quarter of 2007. 206  
Signs of stress in this market became visibly clear by the middle of 2007. 
In June 2007, credit rating agencies began to downgrade mortgage-backed 
securities. 207 By August 2007 problems at major financial firms and investment 
funds became prevalent due to losses on mortgage-related products. Several large 
“subprime” mortgage lenders went bankrupt.  
Markets reacted by increasing risk spreads, especially on bank-related 
securities. Haircuts on securitized assets in the repurchase markets started to 
accelerate. By late 2007, the market for newly-issued mortgage-backed securities 
issued by private firms had come to a halt.208 
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In one study, the average loss for banks during 2007 and 2008 was 26 
percent, with almost one quarter of the banks losing over 50 percent of their 
market value.209 The bust would claim the lives of 360 lending institutions.210 
It could be said that lenders, with an approving nod from government, 
simply went too far in their sub –prime lending practices. When the inevitable 
homeowner defaults began, they exposed weak spots in mortgage-backed 
securities, which in turn caused the spreading lack of confidence in these 
investments, withdrawal of investor funding, and liquidity crisis for lenders. 
Ultimately, bankruptcy and foreclosure emerged rather a panacea of widespread 
homeownership and escalating investor profits. 
The mortgage crash immediately caused the subsequent credit crisis. 
While many refer to these economic events in tandem they are distinct events 
with related but distinct causes. The credit crisis is not discussed here based on 
the logic that, had a mortgage crisis not occurred, a credit crisis would have not 
occurred as well. Because the mortgage crisis precluded the credit crisis it became 
the topic of this thesis. Many refer to the economic crisis as a mortgage crisis, or 
specifically a subprime-mortgage crisis211. As should be clear throughout this 
paper it is my view that the economic issues are multi-faceted and integrated. The 
crisis is a series of incentives faced by individuals and incentives that encouraged 
                                                 
209 Rosen, 2010 
210 Zywicki and Okloski, 2009 
211 See section: SUBPRIME for a definition of subprime lending used in this paper. 
 81 
the behavior exhibited during the boom and bust.  Again, it was the aggregate 
action, not a singular part of the system, that caused a boom with massive 





CHAPTER TEN: LENDING INSTITUTIONS 
The final two chapters examine the risks and incentives that led to them in 
the financial system. Loan originators merit special attention as key entities in the 
financial system. Originators have now become an intermediary originating 
mortgages for homebuyers and reselling them to investors. As the supply side of 
mortgages for the homebuyers as well as the supply side of mortgages for the 
financial system, the mortgage originators decision to lend is in a particularly 
precarious position. This chapter provides an analysis of some peculiar incentives 
present to originators of debt, which prompted an escalation of lending even as 
signs of an overvalued boom were emerging. It is my firm belief that every piece 
of the system (financial and homebuyers) played a significant role in the crisis, 
however, lending institutions faced particularly strong incentives and were central 
to the system. 
SUBPRIME: 
The mortgage crisis is frequently referred to as the subprime mortgage 
crisis. This thesis has refrained from using the term subprime mostly because the 
term subprime does not have an industry standard.212 Loans and securities 
marketed as subprime are typically comprised of either riskier borrowers 
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(borrower quality) or riskier loan structures.213 Many of the “innovative” products 
presented in Part One (i.e. ARM loans, etc.) would typically be considered 
subprime. Similarly, loans made to low credit score borrowers are also considered 
subprime loans. Securities with risky loan structures and/or made to low credit 
score borrowers would be marketed as subprime mortgage backed securities. The 
growth in subprime loans is consistent with what I refer to as “access and 
affordability” discussed in Part One.214  
During the expansionary period, subprime lending was largely heralded as 
a great success.215 This type of lending allowed 9 million new homeowners to live 
in their own homes and use property to build wealth.216 The subprime mortgage 
loan market grew from $35 billion in 1994 to $665 billion in 2005.217 The 
subprime share of total mortgage originations climbed from 10 percent to 23 
percent.218  
Many attribute the mortgage crash to the expansion of subprime lending 
with defaults occurring largely from loans given to riskier borrowers and/or loans 
                                                 
213 This will be the definition used in this paper.  
214 Great lengths were made throughout this paper to attempt to differentiate between 
loans made to risky borrowers or loans made with risky loan structures, however, in 
finance and most economic literature the term subprime is used indiscriminately. Any 
quantitative references to the subprime market are comprised of loans or pools of 
mortgages marketed as subprime.  
215 Gerardi, et al. 2008 and Schloemer, et al., 2006 
216 Singh and Bruning, 2011 and Cornett, 2008 
217 Schloemer, et al., 2006 
218 Schloemer, et al., 2006 
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with risky structures.219 Certainly both inherently risky products as well as access 
to credit to riskier borrowers were contributing factors to the instability in the 
mortgage market. The following subsections will examine why lenders issued 
these loans.  
QUESTIONING THE BUBBLES EXISTANCE: 
There was significant debate during the expansionary period as to whether 
the mortgage market was experiencing a boom or not. While lending was more 
risky because of lower borrower quality and inherently risky loan structures, 
positive market conditions kept them from default.220 House price growth 
increased the amount of equity in homes enabling borrowers who might have 
been close to default to refinance, maintaining mortgage performance. Strong 
performance served to encourage the use of innovative loan products; which 
encouraged even more aggressive loans throughout the expansionary period.221  
Because of exceptionally strong loan performance, economists heavily 
debated the stability of the mortgage market.222 In 2005, TIAA-CREF published 
two competing views.223 Shiller (2005), citing the rise in home values beyond 
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historical mean, provided support that there was a bubble, while Peach (2005) 
argued that increased home prices and the ratio of rental incomes to home prices 
were reflecting improvements in the quality of houses and changes in the 
financing market to suggest a bubble was not present. 
Others argued that while theoretically we knew the system was at 
heightened risk, we did not understand the true quantitative repercussions.224 This 
could be due to an inability to model decreases in asset prices or a belief that 
defaults would be insensitive to drops in asset prices.225  
In 2004, Alan Greenspan dismissed the possibility that the US was in a 
housing bubble: “a national severe price distortion,” he declared, was “most 
unlikely.” In 2005, Ben Bernanke insisted that home-price increases “largely 
reflect strong economic fundamentals."  
The absence of a widespread realization of the extreme risk in the 
mortgage market at the time allows for individuals and institutions to make 
decisions based on the incentives presented to them without questioning how 
much risk they were injecting into the system. At the very least, the questionable 
nature of a realization of risk encourages decisions to be made so that individuals 
and institutions don’t fall behind their competition.  
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COMPETITION: 
The financial system, and originators in particular, are in business for 
profit.  In order to compete in the lending market, banks need to originate the loan 
types that are in demand, otherwise risk losing business to competing firms. The 
lending institutions faced a strong incentive to follow keep up with their 
competitor’s practices otherwise risk losing business. The brokerage market 
during the expansionary period was brutally competitive due to the entry into the 
market of independent brokers, especially online mortgage lenders.226 
Competition manifested itself in two ways, servicing borrowers with increasingly 
higher credit risk227 and offering inherently risky loan structures228. Lenders 
originated products that were in demand (inherently risky products) and began to 
issue loans to riskier borrowers out of a need to find buyers for their mortgage 
products. Eventually the pool of homeowners they were attracting subsisted 
largely of subprime borrowers. As long as the secondary market had an appetite 
for subprime loans, this was not a problem for lenders as subprime loans were 
typically accompanied by higher fees. 
FEE BASED INCENTIVE: 
Because mortgage originators operating under the originate and distribute 
model collect fees regardless of loan performance, they had little incentive stop 
risky lending. While many insist that the originate and distribute model induced 
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risky behavior because the originators were not holding the loans on their books 
(moral hazard), theoretically this is a poor explanation because investors would 
care about the credit quality of the loans and stop buying the securities. However, 
because of the lack of transparency in mortgages and securities I cannot fully 
discount that moral hazard was not present.  Asymmetric information was 
involved; one considers the originate to distribute model method the loan 
originators have less incentive to follow the methods that would otherwise been 
employed to avoid the dangers of asymmetric information and adverse 
selection.229 Banks in the originate and distribute market were in a volume driven 
business, not a quality business. The innovative structures were particularly 
popular and thus helped drive volume.  The riskier loans and loans made to 
weaker borrowers also typically came with higher fees. Banks also received a 
larger fee for selling a bigger loan,230 further incentivizing banks to push both 
risky products and larger loans. 
Low/no down payment loans enabled borrowers to buy higher priced 
houses. Similarly, with liar loan, where individuals were not required to prove 
their income to get a loan, the borrower and/or the lender could intentionally 
overstate the borrowers income in order to qualify for a larger loan at a more 
favorable rate.231 Low documentation loans comprise more than 50 percent of the 
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subprime mortgages and 90 percent of these loans had inflated incomes compared 
to IRS documents.232 ARM loans were also particularly advantageous to the 
lenders, because they necessitated repeated refinancing. At each refinancing, 
originators received more fees. The lending institutions had a strong incentive to 
provide these high risk mortgages and the homebuyers also demanded these 
products.  
The mortgage market during this period had an especially peculiar 
incentive. Both borrower and lender incentives to maximize the size of the loan 
were in line. Mortgage originators got a larger fee for originating a larger 
mortgage, and again for selling it off and most borrowers wanted the largest 
mortgage possible.233 Originators did not hold any risk if the borrower did not 
repay, so selling the highest fee-generating loan possible was best for them, 
giving them little incentive to issue safer or smaller loans. 
Because of this mutual incentive, homebuyers and banks both ended up 
inflating estimates of what the buyer could afford and exaggerating the value of 
the house.234 A number of empirical studies support the notion that banks 
originated with the sole intent of selling mortgages to earn fees, not for risk 
management.235  
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The originate and distribute model was intended to, among other things, 
improve credit risk transfer, making the financial system safer. It was also argued 
that banks would sell their safest assets, or at least not their worst assets, to 
reassure investors.236 While banks have an incentive to issue a larger volume with 
less regard for quality, theoretically investors would be cognizant of the risk they 
were holding and still demand loans of high quality, averting moral hazard.  
However, originate and distribute lending involves transactions among 
distant participants, where the originator is supposed to act in the best interest of 
the borrower and investment bank/investor. This relationship is fundamentally 
vulnerable to adverse behavior due to a misalignment of incentives. Because of 
the originators incentive to initiate a large quantity of loans they are at risk to 
reduced screening efforts.237 
When a bank decides to issue a loan, some characteristics of the decision 
are easy to credibly communicate to third parties, however, there are other soft 
pieces of information that cannot be easily verified by parties other than the 
originating institution itself. “As the originating institution sheds off the credit 
risk and as the distance between the originator and the ultimate holder of risk 
increases, loan officers’ ex-ante incentives to collect soft information 
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decreases”238 Evidence suggests that reliance on hard information for subprime 
loans increased as securitization did.239  
Originate and distribute banks originated and sold large amounts of loans 
with inferior soft information.240 Banks with aggressive involvement in the 
originate and distribute model of lending did not actively screen their borrowers 
along the soft information dimension. Because of the absence of this information 
banks with higher originate and distribute participation have higher mortgage 
default rates while banks that originated loans with an intention to keep on their 
balance sheets had lower default rates.  
The quality of loans deteriorated for six consecutive years before the crisis 
hit and banks were acutely aware of it.241 Standards were poor, especially with 
loans that incorporated unverified incomes.242 Lenient underwriting standards 
magnify the risk of loans that already include high-risk features.243 
A portion of the stock market decline for banks in 2007-2008 was related 
to the banks’ pre-crisis distribute activity.244 Over 80 percent of traded banks 
reported at least some distributed sales while only a few banks specialized in 
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originating and selling mortgages. For most banks, mortgage sales were a small 
part of their business. The issues in securitization markets had an impact on these 
low-OTD banks that was, in general, not likely to be solvency-threatening. The 
risky proportion of a bank’s stock price was larger for banks with more significant 
distributed sales. 
 Banks did less screening for subprime mortgages they planned to sell.245 
Conditional on being securitized, the portfolio that is more likely to be 
securitized, defaults by around 20 percent more than a similar risk profile group 
with a lower probability of securitization (these two portfolios have similar 
observable risk characteristics and loan terms). 
 Further evidence can be seen by examining default levels around 
securitization cutoff levels. See (Figure 18: Delinquencies on the Margin)246  
Figure 18: Delinquencies on the Margin 
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Around cutoffs loans have similar observable risk features, demographic 
characteristics, and loan terms. Loans just above a credit score threshold default 




CHAPTER ELEVEN: OTHER ISSUES 
While lenders are a key intermediary between the homebuyers and the rest 
of the financial system, a significant role in the market is controlled by the 
behavior of the investment banks, rating agencies, and investors. The whole 
mortgage market is an intricate machine where all the parts must move 
simultaneously for the system to work. Chapter Ten presented many risk 
enhancing actions that lenders took that it would seem would be a concern for the 
other financial participants. However, the other financial participants responded to 
their own incentives which allowed the system to build an incredible amount of 
risk.  
REPACKAGING: 
Investment banks have the same fee based incentives as the originators, 
focusing on maximizing the quantity of loans they can move into investors’ 
hands. For investment banks repackaging loans into MBS, the complex derivative 
structures are designed and marketing crafted to entice investors to buy the 
products. Banks and investment banks, just like the originators, have an incentive 
to originate the assets that are in high demand and thus feed the frenzy.247 
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Due to the complexities of securitization, securities were inherently 
opaque.248 To make the securities even riskier securitizers were, to an extent but 
not fully, aware of the decreasing loan quality due beyond that of the inherently 
risky loan structure and borrower quality.249 However, possibly the biggest flaw 
was that investment banks, similar to the “soft information” screening failure, had 
their own standards failure. Rochard Bowen, Sr VP & chief underwriter, 
Citigroup 2002-09 found that 60 percent of loans did not meet Citibank’s credit 
policy.250  
Alan Sloan provides the details of one particularly disastrous mortgage 
pool by a top tier firm.251 Goldman Sachs Alternative Mortgage Products 
(GSAMP) assembled 8274 second mortgage loans valued at $494mm.The 
average equity a borrow in the pool had at inception was 0.71 percent: 99.29 
percent of the home value was loaned, and 58 percent of the loans were no or low 
documentation. This particular deal was sliced into 13 separate tranches and 68 
percent of the issue was rated AAA by two rating agencies.252 25 percent of the 
issue was rated investment grade at levels from AA to BBB. In this pool 93 
percent was rated investment grade. Less than 18 months after the issue, 17 
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percent of the borrowers had already defaulted on their loans.253 Investors who 
paid face value for these securities suffered heavy losses. 
RATING AGENCIES: 
Faced with a prospectus over 300 pages when investing in a MBS, 
investors largely relied on rating agencies when investing in deals.  Rating 
agencies are considered as objective and reliable judges of securities quality.254  
Rating agencies have come under significant attack for the generous ratings given 
to most MBS.  
The rating agencies behaved in an understandable way. The rating 
agencies relied on limited data and bad quantitative models. The ratings seem 
justified because the limited data on the market said these were good investments. 
The rating agencies, just like the investment banks, used flawed models.255 
Analysts used fairly sophisticated tools, but were hampered by the absence of 
episodes of falling prices in their data. The problems were particularly severe for 
subprime loans, since there were none before 1998.256 Many analysts anticipated 
the crisis in a qualitative way, laying out, in various ways, a roadmap of what 
could happen, but never fleshed out the quantitative implications.257 Finally, they 
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expected home values to remain high (or at least not collapse), or they may have 
expected subprime defaults to be insensitive to a big drop in home values.258  
Others criticize the rating agencies for giving good ratings because they 
are being paid to rate securities. If securities are rated highly, investors will 
continue to buy, banks will continue to produce, and the rating agencies will have 
more securities to rate and generate fees from.259 Some have suggested that rating 
agencies chose to lower their standards for rating mortgage securities rather than 
lose business to competitors.260  
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, among others, might not have 
fully understood risk, but they did understand incentives. They had 
an incentive to please those who were paying them. And the 
competition among the rating agencies just made matters worse: if 
one rating agency did not give the grade that was wanted, the 




Stiglitz262 maintains that the warning signs were clearly ignored, claiming 
that it was well known that the financial sector was engaged in “shenanigans” and 
that this should have served as a warning to investors. “To any rational individual, 
there was a high likelihood that many of these ‘novel’ mortgages would 
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eventually not be repaid, no doubt of future losses would have to be made until 
the mortgage actually went into delinquency.”  
Investors, however, were searching for higher yields and kept increasing 
their demand for mortgage-backed securities.263 This demand partially led to an 
increases in the subprime share of the mortgage market (from around 8 percent in 
2001 to 20 percent in 2006) and in the securitized share of the subprime mortgage 
market (from 54 percent in 2001 to 75 percent in 2006).264 Investment managers 
also had an incentive to herd with one another because herding provides insurance 
that the manager will not underperform his peers.265  
The risks that investors took may not have been apparent to investors, due 
to obscured transparency issues from investment banks and originators. The 
investors relied on rating agencies, however, this reliance may have drawn in 
many investors who were not financially sophisticated or aware of nuances in the 
mortgage market.266 Stiglitz describes the selling of mortgages to investors as the 
‘greater fool theory.’ Many investors abroad did not understand America’s unique 
mortgage market, especially the idea of nonrecourse mortgages. According to 
Stiglitz267, investors did not take a realistic look at the loans they owned until 
mortgages started to default. 
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Eventually, the market would collapse and mortgage-backed securities 
would quickly lose value. The average collateralized debt obligation (CDO) lost 
about half of its value between 2006 and 2008.268 “It was then that investors 
slowly started to take a realistic look at the risks they were holding in their 
investments, not just looking at the returns.”269 The investors began to speculate 
that they held more exposure for too low of a rate in their portfolios. Investors in 
large numbers suddenly wanted to cash out and a number of hedge funds and 
major brokerage firms collapsed.270 The marks the beginning of the credit crisis, 
where credit markets froze. 
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This paper explored many of the structural and personal incentives 
inherent in the mortgage market from 2001 to 2007. The mortgage expansion and 
contraction was not the fault of one entity, action, or change in the 
economy/financial system but a logical reaction to the incentives faced by 
individuals and institutions. These incentives worked together to cause an 
incredible economic expansion that also had extreme, and largely unrecognized, 
risks which ultimately led to a severe crash. 
While the housing market began to accelerate in 1995, due to the dot-com 
bubble, we consider the period between 2001 and 2007 to be an economic period 
defined by the mortgage markets expansion and contraction. This is because the 
continued expansion of homeownership and increase in property values after the 
dot-com crash is fueled by the ability of homebuyers to borrow rather than on an 
increase in income or wealth.  
An American culture of property ownership, which dates back to this 
countries founding, was reinvigorated during expansionary period due to rhetoric 
from politicians and private sector executives. Individuals were driven by more 
than a utilitarian consideration when electing to purchase property on credit. 
Some Americans we’re buying property for the first time, fulfilling a piece of the 
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“American dream” while others we’re attempting to build wealth through equity 
in property. A culture that values property ownership gave Americans a personal 
incentive while Access and affordability caused a structural incentive for 
homeowners to borrow. The financial system during the expansionary period 
offered easy access to credit at very favorable rates.  
 A number of incentives encourage the financial system to participate in 
the mortgage market. The rise of securitization provided a new method for 
investment banks and investors to become involved and profit off of mortgages. 
This also allowed the mortgage originators increase liquidity so they could 
provide more loans to homebuyers. The financial system and investors believed 
that securitization had increased the safety of investing in mortgages.  During the 
expansionary period, due to the perceived increase in safety and liquidity injection 
from securitization, lenders began to issue mortgages to previously underserved 
groups of Americans. A rapid rise in house prices due to the demand for property 
caused strong performance in mortgage-backed securities. This culminated into a 
self-fulfilling prophecy where markets continued to assume that mortgage-backed 
securities were a safe investment and continued providing liquidity to borrowers 
fueling an increase in house prices which made mortgage-backed securities 
continue to perform well.  
 The incredible growth in the mortgage market during the early 2000s is a 
response to each individual’s (both homebuyers and financial system institutions 
and the people that make up the organizations) incentives and, albeit shortsighted, 
perceptions of the markets sustainability, which in aggregate allowed and 
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enormous bubble to form. It quite understandable why the market behaved the 
way did. However, at least in hindsight, it is easy to identify significant risks 
within this booming market. Risky lending practices in the form of high-risk loans 
such as low/no down-payment and adjustable–rate/ negative amortization loans 
and loans made to high-risk borrowers might have a relatively low propensity for 
default while house prices are rising and interest rates remain low, however, they 
have a very high propensity for default when house prices are stagnant or 
decreasing and interest rates fall. The era of rising property values and ultra-low 
interest rates was unsustainable. 
A catalyst for collapse came when the supply houses outpace demand. 
Some high-risk borrowers began to default which caused credit markets to 
tighten. While some borrowers were forced into default other borrowers 
responded to the underwater value of their property by defaulting on their loans 
regardless of their ability to pay. The financial system suffered a catastrophic 
collapse in response to turmoil from the housing market fallout. This is largely 
due to linkages within the financial system that intertwined financial institutions 
balance sheets as well as highly leveraged institutions. The financial crisis and 
credit crisis that resulted from the mortgage market crash is not discussed in this 
thesis. The decision to focus on the housing crisis specifically is rooted in the 
belief that the housing market precipitated the financial/credit crisis.  
The mortgage market is a very complicated system that has many 
influences acting on it at one time. Much of the literature surveyed for this thesis 
provides a deeper examination of these incentives on an individual basis. Many of 
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those works attempt to assert that one, or a few factors were the fundamental 
reason for the markets failure. The attempt to stay neutral on the merits and 
pitfalls of individual ideas in this paper is largely rooted in a belief that the 
aggregate action of each participant in the market, acting on the incentives 
presented to them, is the cause for exuberance during the 2000s.  
The purpose of this paper is to highlight the complex interactions in the 
market and provide an awareness of why the market behaved the way it did 
through an examination of the incentives each participant faced. It is my personal 
belief, and one this paper supports, that had one incentive been changed and the 
behavior of one participant modified the market would have been unable to 
produce quite as large of a bubble. If the homebuyers had different incentives that 
lowered demand to buy property the market would have failed to take off, if 
lenders did not have the incentives to underwrite risky loans the market would 
have been quieter and safer, and if the rest of the financial system was not 
interested in asset-backed securities due to an incentive to invest money 
elsewhere liquidity would not have been available to support the massive amount 
of borrowing.  
It must be stressed that when this period is examined as a means to draw 
conclusions on how the behavior that caused the crash can be mitigated in the 
future, most, if not all, suggestions have known drawbacks and potentially 
unknown adverse consequences, just as the changing mortgage market during the 
2000s resulted in a realization of many unintended adverse events.   
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 Another question remains, are we at risk to this market repeating itself. In 
my opinion the short answer is no, the conditions are not present now and are not 
likely to be present in the near future for this to be repeated. The conditions for 
this massive expansion and contraction were very unique. Many pieces needed to 
behave in a very precise way. Removing one key component, or even diminishing 
it, would not allow these market conditions to exist.  The market conditions 
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